Explaining China's Continued Resistance Towards Human Rights Norms: A Historical Legal Analysis by Sitaraman, Srini
ACDIS
Occasional  
Paper
Explaining China’s Continued Resistance Towards 
International Human Rights Norms: 
A Historical Legal Analysis
Srini Sitaraman
Assistant Professor
Department of Government and International Relations
Clark University
Research of the Program in Arms Control, 
Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
June 2008
This publication is supported by funding from the 
University of Illinois. It is produced by the Program in 
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The University of Illinois is an equal opportunity/
affirmative action institution.
ACDIS Publication Series:  The ACDIS International 
Security Policy Brief series highlights ongoing academic 
research at ACDIS and the University of Illinois that serves 
to inform U.S. and international policy decisions. ACDIS 
Swords and Ploughshares is a periodic bulletin of collected 
articles aimed at a general audience. The ACDIS Occasional 
Paper series is the program’s principal publication for 
circulating the scholarly analytical results of faculty, 
students, and visiting researchers associated with ACDIS. 
The ACDIS Research Reports series publishes technical 
reports and the findings from contracted grant research. 
For additional information and to download publications, 
visit the ACDIS home page at:
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/
Published 2008 by ACDIS//ACDIS SIT:1.2008 
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign 
359 Armory Building, 505 E. Armory Ave. 
Champaign, IL 61820-6237
Series editor:  Matthew A. Rosenstein 
Editorial assistant:  Kathy Conner 
  
Explaining China’s 
Continued Resistance 
Towards International 
Human Rights Norms 
A Historical Legal Analysis 
 
 
Srini Sitaraman 
Department of Government and International Relations 
Clark University 
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
June 2008 

 iii 
CONTENTS 
 
About the Author v 
Abstract vii 
Acknowledgments ix 
Part One  
Introduction 1 
Part Two  
Notions of Law and Order in Imperial China: Confucianism and Legalism 3 
Individual Rights in the Chinese Legal Tradition 3 
Legal Codes of Imperial China: Legalized Confucianism 5 
Imperial China, Western Powers, and International Law: The Manchu Period 7 
Part Three  
Legal Reforms: The Republican and the Nationalist Eras 9 
Part Four  
People’s Republic of China: Rule by Man Over Rule by Law 11 
The Concept of Individual Rights in Revolutionary China 12 
Communist China and International Law 13 
Part Five  
Economic Reform and China’s Participation in Human Rights Conventions 17 
Human Rights and Rule-of-Law: International Pressure Linkages 19 
Saving Face and Cultural Sensitivity to Foreign Criticism 20 
Part Six  
Political Order and Human Rights in Post-Revolutionary China 23 
Reforms and Social Stability—Strike-Hard Campaigns and the Death Penalty 24 
Arrest, Arbitrary Detention, and Suppression of Dissent 28 
Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Coercive Extraction of Confessions 29 
Repression and Control of Religious Activities 32 
Part Seven  
Conclusion 35 
Notes 37 
 
 

 v 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
 
Srini Sitaraman is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and International Relations at Clark 
University and a Research Associate at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. He 
teaches courses on United Nations and International Law, Human Rights, Political Economy, and International 
Relations. He has published various articles and monographs on International Environmental and Security 
Regimes, and on South Asian Security issues. Professor Sitaraman received his Ph.D. in Political Science from 
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign under the supervision of Professors Edward Kolodziej and Paul 
Diehl. He also holds a M.A. in International Affairs from Ohio University and a M.A. in Economics from the 
University of Madras, India. Currently, he is working on a book manuscript focused on compliance and 
resistance towards international treaty regimes 
 

 vii 
ABSTRACT 
 
The People’s Republic of China has made significant strides in updating its commercial law, introduced a series 
of environmental regulations, and utilized international legal statutes to reform various aspects of its municipal 
legal system. However, problems persist in the area of compliance with and implementation of international 
human rights regimes. This article examines why China is wary of international human rights law and why it 
has difficulties complying with international human rights norms. Specifically, this article seeks to understand 
why PR China is antagonistic towards human rights law, while it has been welcoming of other forms of legal 
reform, institutional development, and foreign cooperation. I argue that China’s compliance problem and its 
inability to fully internalize international human rights norms can be explained by the combination of the 
following three factors: (1) Confucian influence and imperial institutionalist heritage, (2) Maoist socialist order, 
and (3) authoritarian-developmentalism. These three structural factors have interacted in complex ways at 
different political junctures to inhibit China from fully internalizing international human rights norms, thereby 
affecting its ability to successfully comply with its treaty obligations. 
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PART ONE 
Introduction 
 
Of all China’s problems, the one that trumps everything is the need for stability. We have to jump on 
anything that might bring instability; we can’t give ground on this point, can’t bend at all…all this 
boils to one thing: China can’t take chaos. We can’t allow chaos, and we have to keep saying so, 
bluntly and openly. We’d be wrong not to.  
Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, during the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis1 
 
Any crime which the law regards as serious should certainly receive serious penalties, and any crime 
which is punishable by the death penalty according to law, should certainly receive the death penalty. 
This will ensure the healthy progress of strike hard. 
President Hu Jintao, remarks made while he was the Secretary of the Standing Committee of the 
Central Political Bureau Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 4 May 1996 
 
The People’s Republic of China has witnessed a spectacular economic and international resurgence since 1978 
after Deng Xiaoping introduced a series of sweeping reforms. Today China is experiencing blistering economic 
growth; its trade surplus is continuously expanding, its manufacturing capacity is interminably widening, and its 
global economic reach has catapulted China from a third-world state to near first-world status. Nevertheless, 
daunting challenges confound China in undertaking environmental clean-up, enforcing banking regulations, 
guaranteeing intellectual property rights, and especially, in the area of human rights. The People’s Republic has 
to grapple with widespread corruption, white-collar crime, and growing economic inequality, which is placing 
enormous pressure on its weak institutional foundations and eroding the ability of the central government to 
effectively manage the transition from a communist dictatorship to a neo-authoritarian capitalist state. Of all the 
challenges confronting China today, its inability to address its persistent human rights problems has prevented it 
from attaining international prestige and respect. China’s human rights violations and the inadequacies of its 
judicial system have received widespread international opprobrium. PR China has not only attempted to 
introduce legal reforms, such as abolishing the hukou (household registration system), but it has also countered 
international criticism by joining various human rights treaties, attained membership in the newly formed 
United Nations Human Rights Council, hosted global rights conferences such as the Beijing Women’s 
Conference held in 1995, and mounted a carefully coordinated strategy of countering its critics through 
international policy networks. Nevertheless, persistent and systematic human rights abuses continue, and 
criticisms of China’s human rights policies have not abated. 
This article sets out to examine why China is wary of making international human rights law an effective 
component of its domestic legal system and why it has failed to pursue sincere efforts to reform its criminal law, 
improve its human rights record, and fully comply with international norms. Specifically, this article seeks to 
investigate why China is antagonistic towards human rights regimes, while it has been welcoming of other 
forms of legal reform, institutional development, and foreign cooperation. To answer this question, this article 
generates an explanation relying on the following three interrelated historical and contemporary factors: (1) 
Confucian influence and imperial institutionalist heritage, (2) Maoist socialist order, and (3) developmental-
authoritarianism. 
Confucianism and Legalism, which evolved as competing legal paradigms in ancient China, influenced the 
development of legal thinking and institutional structure over three millennia. Legal discourse during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became infused with mistrust of foreign laws and Western governments 
because of China’s poor experience with European laws and coerced entry into various unequal treaties. 
Subsequently, anti-colonialism, distrust of international law, and historical legalism merged with nationalism 
and socialist thought, resulting in renewed emphasis on the primacy of state and national sovereignty, which in 
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turn furthered the animus towards international law and organizations. This antipathy towards formal law in 
general, and international law specifically, was further reinforced by Maoism, which was based on rule by 
diktat, nonchalant dismissal of international law, use of law as an instrument of social control, and mass 
mobilization to suppress individualism to propagate the narrow ideological objectives of the Communist Party. 
The pre-Mao imperial political system, Maoist socialist order, and the post-Mao political organization are 
structured on a legal philosophy that does not recognize the concept of individual civil and political liberties.  
Both the imperial political order and the Maoist socialist order did not contain political mechanisms that could 
potentially capacitate the individual against the state. Unlike Western political systems, which have evolved to 
construct a legal infrastructure as a free-standing institution to mediate relations not only among individuals, but 
also between the state and the citizen, the Chinese state has always been beyond the admonition of its citizens or 
other states. As a result, Qin, Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing emperors never tolerated criticism, dissent, or legal 
challenges to their supremacy and neither have Chairman Mao and the Communist Party of China (CCP) 
countenanced dissent and political challenges lightly. 
Lastly, the authoritarian political structure and the new developmentalist ideology have presented new 
hurdles to China’s compliance with global human rights standards. Leaders in Beijing are deeply wary of the 
heavy emphasis on individual rights because they fear that it will lead to luan (chaos), i.e., widespread social 
upheaval, which will destroy the collectivist culture of Chinese society, destabilize economic reforms, and 
erode the unitary framework erected by the Chinese Communist Party. The new political orthodoxy in China 
puts primary emphasis on Deng Xiaoping’s slogan “to-get-rich-is-glorious,” and not on enabling individual 
liberties and promoting more political openness because of the overwhelming concern that civil and political 
liberties will engender organized political opposition against the party. Economic rights have been significantly 
expanded, but the party-state continues to repress political rights and individual freedoms, and has used the 
judiciary and police to suppress dissent. Hence, China’s fourth generation leaders have increasingly resorted to 
emphasizing economic development with Chinese characteristics and re-directed the authoritarian edifice of the 
state to enable and encourage economic gains at the expense of political development. Party leaders are more 
interested in strengthening the protective shell of authoritarianism and reinforcing state power, while 
simultaneously transforming the Chinese society to become a highly competitive player in the global economic 
system. 
Discussion that follows in this research monograph is divided into five main sections with appropriate 
subsections. The first section (Part Two) focuses on how Confucian philosophy influenced the development of 
Chinese legal doctrine, and how the political experience of Imperial China affected its attitude towards 
international law and Western legal traditions. Next, Part Three discusses ultimately unsuccessful attempts 
during the interregnum between the fall of the Qing dynasty and the birth of the People’s Republic of China to 
reform the Chinese legal system based on principles derived from Western legal codes. Part Four examines how 
Maoist thought influenced attitudes towards international human rights law and how it led to the 
underdevelopment of the domestic legal system. The next section, Part Five, is divided into multiple 
subsections, which describe how the transition engineered by Deng Xiaoping propelled China towards the 
market economy accompanied by an incomplete reform of the political and legal system. This section also 
discusses how international economic and political pressure compelled the People’s Republic to make subtle, 
but important, changes to its domestic legal system through the incorporation of international human rights 
norms. Although China has ratified some of the major human rights treaties, it has engaged only in procedural 
cooperation with the treaty bodies and it has failed to introduce corresponding refinements in the area of 
domestic human rights law. The last main section, Part Six, concludes by examining China’s human rights 
policies in the post-Tiananmen era and discusses how economic reforms and the excessive importance placed 
on social order and political stability combined with institutional bottlenecks have hindered full compliance 
with human rights conventions. 
 3 
PART TWO 
Notions of Law and Order in Imperial China: Confucianism and Legalism 
 
China’s conception of public etiquette, law, order, punishment, and rights has been shaped by the doctrine of 
legalism and competing legal doctrines derived from the writings of Confucius and Mencius.2 Confucianism is 
primarily concerned with the moral code of conduct and empathy or humanism (li) or (lizhi) documented in the 
classic text the Analects of Confucius.3 It embodies the rules of “propriety, ethics, and moral rules of conduct.” 
Importantly, the code of li represents social norms that are internalized through routine social practices such as 
greeting strangers on the street.4 The legal structure (fa) or (fazhi) operates to punish transgressors of li or 
disturbers of social harmony. According to the traditional Chinese legal system, the code of li is enforced by 
society and the state enforces fa, but various Chinese emperors, beginning with the Qin Emperor in 221 BC, 
have tended to emphasize fa, the system of punishments and fines, over li, the socially enforced system of moral 
code, to varying degrees.5 Confucius urged more emphasis on li (moral code) and less insistence on fa (positive 
law) because reliance on a system of severe punishments involved use of coercion and force, which Confucius 
argued would only breed resentment and anger towards the ruler.6 
Confucian thought did not consider legalism to be an ideal method for attaining social order because it 
required only external compliance and not true reformation of the individual character or the spirit of the social 
system.7 Under the Confucian scheme, the ruler was expected to lead by example, demonstrate his virtue, and 
assist in the cultivation of superior moral values among his subjects.8 The Confucian model of social 
organization was based on harmony and on a hierarchical system of ethics, which assigned pre-determined 
social roles to every individual in the society. It privileged certain members of the society according to family 
and social status.9 Importantly, the Confucian social order was based on the fulfillment of certain social and 
familial roles according to each individual’s position within the family and society. It was believed that if 
individuals fulfilled their social obligations or performed their social roles properly, harmony would naturally 
prevail obviating the need for reform of the formal legal system. 
The idea of harmony is central to Chinese societal organization. Harmony is essential for family life, 
kinship, and the relationship between ruler and his subjects.10 Individuals are expected to place collective 
interests, i.e., the interests of family and society ahead of personal desires. Preoccupation with one’s personal 
interests is considered to be selfish, immoral, and detrimental to the overall welfare of the society. If someone is 
entangled in a conflict, it is generally imprudent to pursue the conflict to its bitter end, even if the law favors 
one party over the other because it would only worsen the enmity and lead to a breakdown of social relations.11 
The notion of resolving conflicts in a non-confrontational and face-saving manner is widely practiced even 
today. Emphasis is placed on resolution of conflicts in a non-adversarial manner through informal mediation 
schemes; hence, legal wrangling and lawsuits are highly discouraged. Confucian practice of reciprocity and 
compromise is meant to encourage social harmony. Pursuit of private interests is thought to produce social 
disharmony, which underscores the need for fa—the system of punishment imposed by the state.12 The 
Confucian system emphasized the importance of subordinating individual interests to the collective goals of a 
society. 
Individual Rights in the Chinese Legal Tradition 
The notion of individual rights as espoused by Western thinkers is fundamentally irreconcilable with Confucian 
social order because it is based on different assumptions about freedom and rights. In the Confucian or in the 
Chinese legal order, “individual rights” or “individual sovereignty” as understood in Western societies is a 
foreign concept. Notions such as “political freedom” and “freedom of expression” as described in liberal 
political thought are not clearly identifiable in the Confucian analects.13 To Confucius, “to be free from 
everything—free from other men, free from law, free from thought, free from sense…is to be nothing.”14 The 
idea of unlimited freedom is considered to be unrealistic, almost nihilistic, and it is not sanctioned by Confucian 
ethics. Freedom in the Confucian ethical scheme is characterized by the freedom to do good (ren) or the 
freedom to choose what is good.15 However, this freedom is governed by ren—the need to do the right deed—
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and by the constraints of family, society, and government. An individual is never viewed in isolation from 
family or society; he/she is always regarded to be a part of the larger social collective. Every person in a society 
has assigned social roles and efficient functioning of a society depends on every person fulfilling his or her 
assigned duties within the immediate social collective. 
Emphasis is placed on performance of duties in a harmonious way. According to Confucian ethics, 
performing one’s duties is more important than claiming one’s rights.16 The Confucian hierarchical system 
assigned defined roles based on the wulan or five paired relationships: (1) emperor/minister; (2) father/son; (3) 
elder brother/younger brother; (4) husband/wife, and (5) friend/friend.17 These paired relationships signified the 
hierarchical consonants through which the emperor’s position in the society trumped the ministers’, or that the 
son must defer to the father and the younger brother must obey the elder brother. Hierarchical order was so 
carefully calibrated that there are no proper Chinese language characters for the term “brother”; characters are 
only available for younger or older brother.18 It was expected that by fulfilling the social duties assigned to each 
relationship, an individual contributed towards the overall development of the family and society. Confucianism 
saw family and social rules to be a self-regulating system based on moral rules of propriety. Furthermore, 
Confucian social order stressed the importance of selflessness, the art of compromise without losing face, and 
adjustment for social harmony. A person’s social worth or status was determined by his or her contribution to 
family and society. Chinese political order has always been based on the assessment of hierarchy and social 
status.19 Confucius regarded individuals as roots and the society as leaves.20 Hence, duty to regulate oneself, i.e., 
self-introspection, was primary, followed by duty to family, clan, village, society, and government. A central 
element of Confucianism involved education for the purposes of internalization of the prevailing social norms, 
acceptance of social hierarchy, and obedience to the ruler. 
The idea of individualism articulated by Confucian social ethic is radically different from the political 
philosophies of Locke, Hume, and Rousseau, which overtly emphasized the importance of individual rights. 
Particularly, characterization of individuals as roots or as foundations for the development of a functioning 
society reflects China’s hierarchical and authoritarian value system.21 Chinese society has always been 
hierarchical and social roles depended upon individuals knowing their place.22 Even during Mao’s time Chinese 
society was hierarchically organized with the Party and its Chairman at the pinnacle, and all social roles were 
politicized and mobilized to serve the larger ideological objectives of the Party. Over a period of three 
millennia, Confucian elites and later the Chinese Communist Party leaders were highly successful in developing 
specialized rituals, rules, and techniques of legitimating myths that supported the rulers and enabled them to 
control China’s vast peasant communities. 
In contrast to the Western legal order, which emphasizes protection of individual rights and seeks to 
empower individuals against the tyranny of the state, the Confucian system placed value on collective interests 
and saw the ruler as a benevolent protector who defends collective interests and punishes individuals who 
deviate from established social norms. Need for law and sanctions arises only when social deviance and 
disharmony prevails or when individuals deviate from established social norms, whereas modern Western legal 
systems operate horizontally, i.e., proceeding from autonomous individuals, to society, and then to the state.23 
Chinese political philosophy did not factor in the possibility of an errant emperor and an aberrant state 
producing chaos or disharmony; only individuals acting on selfish impulses and deviating from established 
norms could produce luan or chaos in society.  Hence, the Chinese legal and political order has been devised to 
protect the state from the citizens and not the other way around. Individual impulses had to be suppressed either 
by Confucian moral code (li) or by the deterrent power of legalism (fa) because of the presumed disruptive 
effect on the state of those impulses. However, this hierarchical political order lacked a very fundamental tool—
a mechanism to remove the ruler from power and a system to protect citizens from the tyranny of the state. 
Pious legitimation of the ruler and his elevation to the position of divinity (son of heaven), and governance of 
the state, which is mandated by heaven itself, meant that the Chinese emperor was beyond human reproach. 
Confucianism became the dominant philosophy because various rulers favored it and, principally, it 
evolved as the primary legal orthodoxy because of the codification or transformation of the Confucian ethic into 
formal legal code (fa) beginning with the Han period (206 B.C-220 A.D). Subsequently Tang (618-907 A.D), 
Ming (1368-1644 A.D) and Qing (1644-1911 A.D) dynasties were continually involved in the process of 
“Legalization of Confucianism,” or “Confucianization of law.”24 This process is also described as “Yin-Yang 
Confucianism,” in which Confucian moral code became polarized into morality and law; while morality was 
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governed by individual actions, law or penal code became the domain of the state.25 Any violations of 
Confucian morality became automatically punishable by law. In fact, expansion of Han, Tang, Ming, and Qing 
empires was made possible not through the private practice of Confucian ethics, but through the means of a 
penal system and coercive use of state power, which reserved harsh punishment for violators of legalized 
Confucian ethics. Legalists asserted the importance of having a well-defined formal penal code containing a list 
of punishable offenses and appropriate rewards for proper behavior to reduce ambiguity in assessing sanctions. 
Utility of a formal penal code enabled the impartial application of state control—fazhi or rule by law—to tame 
the natural instincts of human beings to pursue narrow self-interested gains. Draconian punishments were not 
only seen as an attempt to rectify disharmony in the social order, but were also designed to serve as a deterrent 
to others in the society. Furthermore, the existence of a formal legal code enabled smoother transition and 
continuity of governance from one ruler to another irrespective of the individual talents of each ruler.26 
Legalization of Confucian morality actually led to the complete subordination of the individual to the 
collective—the state—which became an omnipotent entity that rejected “private standards of right and wrong,” 
and decried that there was “no authority above the state,” and no law superior to the “positive laws of the 
state.”27 As Bill Alford points out, law in China always aimed “to buttress rather than supersede” the state.28 
Positive law was a tool of the state and it did not have an existence as an independent and impartial arbiter of 
relations between the sovereign and his subjects.29 The emperor, after all, ruled with the mandate from heaven 
(tianming), which concentrated extraordinary amounts of power in the police, judiciary, and other institutions of 
the state. Transcription of Confucian thought into formal penal codes enabled the development of totalitarian 
and militaristic culture, produced a merit-based bureaucracy, and resulted in a unified ideology, which has 
survived into modern China.30 
Legal Codes of Imperial China: Legalized Confucianism 
Historians concur that China’s imperial era began in 221 BC after the end of the Warring States period (403-220 
BC). The first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi, is generally credited with territorial consolidation, and developing a 
unified Chinese state by standardizing and rationalizing bureaucracy, language, and legal systems. The imperial 
era ended with the slow demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911 AD. One of the single most remarkable aspects of 
the imperial period is that the continuity of the legal codes and maintenance of the basic structure of the 
government and bureaucracy from one dynasty to another were preserved, notwithstanding modifications, 
revisions, and additions by different emperors.31 During the Qin emperor’s reign, legalism became embellished 
with the ethical teachings of Confucius and achieved the status of official orthodoxy. This process is referred to 
as “Legalization of Confucian Thought,” “Confucianization of Law,” or “Imperial Confucianism.”32 Confucian 
legal codes became highly prominent and the subsequent dynasties carried forward these legalist foundations, 
Confucian ethical patina, and totalitarian framework for governance established by the first emperor. 
The sui generis quality of China is embodied in the uninterrupted continuity of Confucianism and imperial 
institutionalism. There is evidence to suggest that techniques for trying law cases were developed during the 
Chou dynasty (1122-256 BC).33 Interestingly, modern Chinese language (standard Mandarin) still retains the 
scripts developed during the Chou dynasty to represent legalisms such as litigation, accusation, and 
interrogation.34 Although positive law (fa) became a common tool of social control and governance employed 
by various Chinese emperors, they retained a critical Confucian trait—the principle of “legalized inequality.”35 
This is one of the most recognizable attributes of the legal continuity that was preserved for much of the 
imperial era and into Mao’s chairmanship (1948-1976), albeit in the latter case in a different format as a 
principle of “legalized differentiation.” During the Mao era, the principle of “legalized differentiation” 
manifested itself in the form of class status. This technique was singularly important in determining sanctions 
both during the imperial and revolutionary era. Issues such as property disputes, marital discords and divorce, 
inheritance and kinship relations were generally addressed within the parameters of civil adjudication and 
informal mediation.36 
Criminal law fell exclusively within the formal realm of the imperial state. During the peak of Qing rule 
(1644-1911 AD), civil codes demonstrated high sophistication and the courts routinely handled civil cases on a 
variety of issues that dealt with property, trade, and social relationships.37 Qing laws were almost entirely 
borrowed from the Ming code of 1585. The Tang dynasty (618–907 AD) passed on the structure of its police 
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and judicial system and legal statutes to the Five Dynasties (907-960 AD) and subsequently to the Song dynasty 
(960–1279 AD).38 Imperial China relied on four types of legal documents: (i) statutes, (ii) edicts, (iii) 
precedents, and (iv) refined or clarified instructions.39 The importance placed on each of these legal documents 
varied from one dynasty to another. For instance, clarified interpretations or private commentaries were more 
common during the Qing period, but the tradition of placing considerable importance on legal statutes (lü) was 
continued by all the imperial dynasties.40 
Penal codes of imperial China imposed sanctions based on hierarchy of the familial relations and social 
status of the perpetrator and the victim of a crime. Social groups, such as the Mandarins or state officials, were 
highly privileged and enjoyed special protections from prosecution compared to a commoner.41 If a commoner 
committed a criminal act he was more severely punished than an individual enjoying high social status. 
Specially, if a commoner were to commit an offense against a high status person, the punishment could range 
from execution to permanent exile. Similarly within a family, if the head perpetrated an offense against a junior 
member he was punished less severely, but if the roles were reversed and a son committed the same offense 
against his father, the punishments were rather excruciating. Punishable crimes included rebellion, disloyalty, 
desertion, parricide, massacre, sacrilege, impiety, discord, insubordination, and incest.42 As the list indicates, 
there were three general categories of offenses: (i) crimes against the empire, (ii) crimes against the society, and 
(iii) crimes against the family. The Han dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) legal code contained more than 400 offenses 
that could be punished by death penalty.43 By the early 1800s, Qing rulers had developed penal codes, which 
dealt with general laws, military laws, criminal laws, civil laws, and fiscal laws, covering 600 pages of an 
English translation by Sir George Staunton in 1810.44 
Charged offenders were subject to corporal sanctions such as caning with the light or heavy end of a 
bamboo stick ranging from 10 to 100 strokes. The number of strokes from the cane varied with the type and 
severity of the crime, and social status of the offender. A combination of caning and exile was often used to 
make atonement for the crimes. Permanent exile, in particular, was considered to be a very serious form of 
punishment because it prevented a person from being buried in their ancestral land; such denial is said to force 
the spirit to wander forever without a final resting place.45 In the case of heinous crimes, the accused were often 
immediately executed; in other instances, the prisoner was publicly executed either by strangulation or 
decapitation after a formal legal review and pronouncement of guilty verdict by the emperor.46 The emperor 
wielded final authority in ratifying death sentences and granting clemency, but petitions were only entertained if 
the status of the offender exceeded the status of his/her victim.47 Simultaneously, another distinguishable 
Confucian humanitarian influence was the inclusion of special legal provisions dealing with women, children, 
disabled, and the elderly.48 
On special occasions, China’s imperial rulers granted an assortment of amnesties and engaged in “acts of 
grace” during which the emperor pardoned the criminals and commuted their sentences and extended special 
benefits to reabsorb criminals back into the society.49 These acts of forgiveness were an attempt by the imperial 
rulers to periodically rely on their celestial powers to cleanse the depraved and immoral individuals and provide 
them with a second chance. Granting of amnesties also enabled the portrayal of the emperor as merciful, just, 
and noble, and demonstrated the redemptive power of the Confucian morality and humanitarianism. Imperial 
China’s rulers also relied on a series of moral exhortations (li) to build virtue and loyalty among subjects. These 
exhortations asked citizens to perform their filial and fraternal duties with due diligence, encouraged generosity, 
promoted social harmony, instructed elders to teach children rules of propriety and customs, and required all 
individuals to abstain from individual aggrandizement, and pay taxes without official urging.50 
Traditional legal positivism has had a long history; the concept of law played a central role in the 
governance structure of imperial China. Unlike Western systems, law in imperial China had broader 
connotations and it is intimately associated with social practice, customs, and formal legality. The character for 
positive law (fa) is formed using three elements: (i) a model or an ideal representation, (ii) stroke representing 
the flow of water, which captures the idea of fairness and balance, and (iii) and a stroke representing linearity, 
which emphasizes the notion of justice and veracity of the ruler.51 Law attained an overt positive dimension as 
the administrative complexity of the various imperial empires increased with time and population growth, and 
li—the moral code—became mere complement.52 
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Imperial China, Western Powers, and International Law: The Manchu Period 
China’s understanding of international law is deeply influenced by its historical experience with Western 
powers and by its Confucian roots. During the imperial era, Chinese weltanschauung was not adjusted to the 
idea of treating maritime Western powers as sovereign equals, and according them the same respect and 
treatment that visiting diplomatic envoys enjoyed in other European capitals. Imperial China’s binary 
categorization of foreign states into tributaries and barbarians made it difficult for the Qing imperial court to 
accommodate the demands of customary European diplomatic practices, which required treating visiting 
emissaries as co-equals. The principle of co-equality in international diplomacy, which formed the basis of 
interaction among European powers, was simply an alien concept to the imperial Chinese administrators. 
European nations regarded modern international law, which resulted from their common experience, as a 
mechanism to regulate relations among sovereign nations. A state’s association with international law to a large 
extent depends upon its relationship or sense of identity with the community of nations within which it 
functions.53 However, imperial China’s historical experience was completely different; it had become 
accustomed and comfortable in its role as the Middle Kingdom in which the Chinese emperor was at the center 
of universe and all power and wealth was thought to flow from the emperor. According to imperial China’s 
hierarchical worldview, all other regions of the world were fundamentally subordinate and they could never be 
regarded as a commensurate power. This assumption and Qing China’s frustration with the European nations 
for failing to recognize the emperor’s exalted position blinded the Manchu rulers from recognizing that they 
were not dealing with “outer barbarians” who could be easily disposed. 
Modern international law, as many legal scholars have pointed out, emerged out of wars and diplomatic 
interactions among continental European powers and Great Britain. Law that governed relations among 
sovereign states was based both on customs and treaties negotiated to define specific aspects of inter-state 
relations that were unique to the European nation-state experience. International law grew out of the customary 
interaction of European states, which was predicated on the need for order, predictability, stability, and 
recognized standards for official conduct of business among sovereign entities.54 Since modern international 
law emerged out of the practices of European states, it retained its distinctive European cultural and diplomatic 
ethic. When the international state system began expanding and when the colonial empires of European powers 
began to grow, they increasingly came into contact with East Asian kingdoms and empires that were based on a 
completely different political order. The ascendant European powers attempted to spread their version of state 
practices to East Asia, which amplified contradictions between European and Asian powers.  
Qing officials’ understanding of international law, particularly treaty-based international law, developed 
under circumstances of coercion and from a position of inherent weakness and vulnerability.55 This Western 
incursion into Chinese territories was the result of intra-European competition for new lands and trading 
partners, which led them to discover new maritime routes to previously unknown lands. Imperial China was 
highly reluctant to engage with Western maritime powers and did not demonstrate any curiosity or urgency in 
learning about their technology, governance, and legal systems.56 Much of Imperial China’s dealings with 
Western powers were characterized by violence and war, in which the Chinese felt that they had been forced 
into unequal bargains.57 Hence, post-Manchu governments were highly distrustful of international law and 
viewed it as a tool of Western imperialism and conquest.58 Initially the Western powers were limited to small 
trading posts along the South China Sea coast. Foreigners were confined to the trading posts in places such as 
Guangzhou and Fuzhou, and they were forbidden from traveling to interior regions or inter-mingling with 
locals, and trading was conducted only through established Chinese trade guilds called cohong.59 
The Guangzhou system was aimed at restricting political, cultural, and religious influences of the 
Westerners. Qing governors hoped to deal with the Europeans as they had dealt with the northern barbarians, by 
isolating the European powers, specifically the British, and restricting their encroachment to the coastal 
regions.60 However, this variation of the tribute system broke down when the British traders achieved a near 
monopoly through opium trade. Growing appetite for opium, which enriched the British Empire and attracted 
more traders to China, heralded the decline of the Qing dynasty. 
All treaties that China concluded from 1840 to1890 are commonly referred to as unequal treaties.61 Prior to 
its dealings with Western powers, Chinese emperors always dealt with client states that bowed to the emperor 
and paid tithe and other gifts. China considered herself to be unequalled and unrivalled in power and wealth, 
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and the divine mandate from heaven provided Chinese emperors the right to rule over their subjects as they 
deemed fit.62 Before 1500 AD, China’s contact with the external world was limited; formal relations were 
restricted to its tributary states. When contacts with Western governments increased, China was so imbued with 
the superior-inferior relationship that the Manchu administrators expected Western governments to accord the 
Chinese emperor the same deference and respect shown by its tributaries.63 Many Western emissaries were 
particularly opposed to performing the ritual act of kowtow before the Chinese emperor. They found the act of 
kowtow to be inappropriate for receiving foreign dignitaries, and they also found Qing administrators’ 
unwillingness to allow permanent diplomatic missions in the capital city to be rather puzzling and frustrating. 
The unequal treaties conferred most-favored-nation (MFN) status on the Western powers, fixed tariffs, and 
the ability to move commodities in and out of China without the formal permission of the Chinese trade guilds 
or provincial governors.64 Moreover, these treaties also gave Western powers extra-territorial jurisdiction, i.e., 
the power to try European citizens under Western civil and criminal code and not under the prevailing Chinese 
penal system.65 In other words, the European states were able to carve out mini-fiefdoms along the South China 
Sea coast. Negotiation of the MFN clause singularly weakened the bargaining position of the Qing because the 
extension of MFN meant that imperial China could not negotiate separate treaty agreements with other 
European states.66 If a particular trade benefit was granted to one European country, it had to be extended to all 
others. However, the Manchu mandarins did not view granting MFN status to be a political blunder. Extension 
of most-favored-nation status was conceptualized as a traditional dynastic policy of treating all “outer 
barbarians” uniformly and keeping them content, fighting among themselves, and out of central China. 
Despite the deep distrust of Western legal principles, Manchu officials realized the strategic advantages of 
learning and utilizing international law for the purposes of negotiation. Two authoritative texts on Western 
international law—Wheaton’s International Law and Vattel’s International Law—were translated into 
Chinese.67 The translation process was apparently fraught with confusion and misinterpretation of Chinese 
characters because Qing administrators could not comprehend concepts such as sovereignty and territorial 
jurisdiction, since such notions did not exist under Confucian legal order.68 To overcome these technical 
difficulties the Manchu emperor established a centralized foreign office in 1861 to translate Western legal 
materials and train Chinese officials in international law.69 China attempted to apply international law in its 
disputes with Japan in 1874, but it was not as adept as Japan in manipulating international law.70 China’s major 
international legal dispute began when some local Chinese killed Japanese merchant sailors. Japan criticized 
China for its inability to protect foreigners in Chinese territory and sought extra-territorial protection for its 
nationals. However, Qing dynasty’s Prince Kung failed to understand the nuances of extra-territoriality and 
extradition laws.  This proved to be particularly costly in the long run. Imperial Chinese administrators failed to 
utilize international law to its fullest extent because it appeared to emphasize issues that seemed trivial. 
Ceremonial matters such as the formal presentation of diplomatic accreditation and audience with the emperor 
without kowtow slighted Manchu officials, whereas they seemed relatively less concerned about tariff 
restrictions, consular jurisdiction, and most-favored-nation privileges.71 This and other experiences reinforced 
the general feeling among Manchu officials that international law would never be applied even-handedly vis-à-
vis China because of its weak bargaining position. Manchu officials did not fully comprehend how international 
law is deeply intertwined with European realpolitik, which emphasized the value of territorial rights, 
sovereignty, and national interests. The inability of Manchu officials to grapple with the nuances of 
international law, the complexities of European politics, and the officials’ clumsy efforts to accommodate 
international law within the bounds of Confucian order led them to conclude unequal treaties that tipped the 
balance in favor of the Western powers.72
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PART THREE 
Legal Reforms: The Republican and the Nationalist Eras 
 
The Qing dynasty’s reign formally ended in 1911 with the Imperial Edict, which resulted in the abdication of 
the throne by the child emperor Puyi. Before the collapse of the Qing dynasty, a Law Commission was 
established to codify and modernize Chinese law and bring it into conformity with Western jurisprudence.73 The 
idea of legal reform was mooted by Qing ministers to end the practice of extraterritoriality, which disallowed 
Westerners from being tried in Chinese tribunals.74 Reformation of the Chinese legal system began as a 
component of the formal re-negotiation of China’s commercial treaties with foreign nations.75 Principally, 
reformation of the Chinese legal system was targeted to end to the practice of extraterritoriality and special 
considerations for treating Western dignitaries. Extraterritoriality was dictated by the Western powers as a 
primary component of the unequal treaties because Chinese laws were thought to be primitive, unsophisticated, 
barbarous, and unsuitable for Western denizens of China. Specifically, (1) the concept of collective or joint 
responsibility, which imposed punishments on relatives, neighbors or superiors at work for the actions of a 
criminal; (2) magistrates were allowed to impose punishments at will through the publication of new edicts; (3) 
liberal use of capital punishment even for minor offenses; (4) reliance on judicial torture to obtain forced 
confessions both from the accused and witnesses; and (5) widespread corruption that delayed administration of 
justice deterred foreign powers from subjecting its citizens to the Chinese judicial system.76 
The principle of extraterritoriality, which allowed the practice of Western laws within Chinese territory, 
was thought to highlight the backwardness of China. Hence, the Imperial Law Codification Commission was 
established in 1904 with drafting assistance from American, European, and Japanese legal experts to refashion 
and modernize Chinese law by reforming and systematizing the judicial institutional structure and its austere 
penal code.77 Reform efforts principally focused on abolishing the antiquated Qing laws on topics such as sale 
of persons and simultaneously reducing the number of offences that could be punishable by death penalty, 
discontinuing the practice of relying on harsh corporal punishment, and limiting dependence on judicial torture 
to extract confessions.78 
After the inauguration of the new Chinese Republic in 1912, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen sought to place China among 
the group of legitimate and “civilized nations” of the world.79 Reorganization and overhaul of the Chinese 
judicial system was planned even before investiture of the new Chinese Republic. A series of legal orders—
Provisional Regulations of the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts (1907), Law of the Organization of the 
Judiciary (1909), and the Provisional Criminal Code (1909)—were promulgated.80 The objectives of these 
resolutions were to create a tiered system of courts—Supreme Court, High Court, District Court, and Local 
Court—with a built-in appeals system, train Chinese judicial officers in Western juridical principles, establish a 
professional bar, increase the output of lawyers and legal scholars, and develop a tradition of judicial 
impartiality and independence.81 The Imperial Law Codification Commission issued a new criminal code in 
1912 and undertook further revisions in 1914 and in 1921. In addition, the Republican government began 
Constitutional reforms in earnest and a new Constitution was announced in October 1923 and it was revised 
again in 1925.82 
Sun Yat-Sen’s goal was to create a unitary republic with a parliament. But progress in amending Chinese 
law to bring it in conformity with Western law was unsuccessful because the influence of Republican central 
government did not extend beyond the coastal provinces, and the unremitting civil war and political disruptions 
did not allow for any sustained implementation of legal reforms.83 Furthermore, many of the provinces were 
unwilling to break sharply away from their imperial legal past and traditionalists resented uprooting China’s 
historical traditions and replacing it with an alien legal system. Traditional Chinese law, which was based on 
Confucian thought, ancient customs, harsh penal measures, and modern versions of Chinese law introduced by 
the new Republic—derived from German, Japanese, Swiss, English, and French civil and criminal codes—
seemed incompatible. 
The provincial governors and judicial officers were unfamiliar with the new codes and found them to be 
unsuitable for effective domestic governance or suppressing political unrest and widespread crime. Even in the 
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major urban centers, transition to modern courts seemed difficult. When Kuomintang nationalists took control 
of China in 1928, legal reforms suffered further setbacks as China increasingly leaned towards the dictatorial 
Soviet model of law and government. Overall, legal reforms attempted during the Republican and Nationalist 
periods failed to have any meaningful impact on Chinese political or legal systems because of chronic civil 
rebellions, political uncertainty, Japanese aggression, the Second World War, and the meteoric rise of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Neither the Kuomintang nor the Republicans were able to pursue Sun Yat-
Sen’s ambitious goal of modernizing China by drawing inspiration from Western legal thought. Opportunity for 
legal reforms during the interregnum between the fall of the Qing dynasty and the birth of the People’s Republic 
of China was lost. With the ascendancy of Mao Tse-Tung and the Communist Party, Chinese legal reforms 
underwent another radical reorganization. This time revolutionary China sought all its inspiration from the 
Stalinist totalitarian model within an imperial overlay. 
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People’s Republic of China: Rule by Man Over Rule by Law 
 
Marxist ideology and the aspirations to build a bottom-up totalitarian state led China’s communist leaders to de-
emphasize law, lawyers, and rights as conceptualized by the Kuomintang politicians. None of the top leaders of 
the CCP had any formal training or practical experience in law.84 Therefore, they did not feel the need to 
develop strong legal institutions or produce lawyers. Mao and senior Party leaders were acutely sensitive to the 
criticism that traditional Chinese law was backward; however they did not want the new revolutionary state to 
adopt Western legal methods because of their disdain for its capitalist foundations. Mao’s imprint on the post-
1949 approach to law was unmistakable; it retained a distinctive socialist anti-elitist character with mass appeal. 
As one of its first acts, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) abolished the set of laws introduced by the 
Kuomintang government, and started creating a new system of people-oriented socialist laws.85 Yet, during the 
immediate post-revolutionary period, the CCP operated in a legal-institutional vacuum.86 Justice was carried out 
on an ad hoc basis in the form of mass trials, special tribunals, and large-scale political campaigns against class 
enemies, capitalists, landowners, and petty criminals. Party cadres determined the prevailing mood among the 
higher echelons of the party in passing judgments; in situations where laws were unclear or nonexistent, the 
cadres simply imposed their own brand of justice.87 From 1949 to 1953, the Chinese legal system reflected 
Mao’s mass-line approach, which sought to obtain and incorporate ideas and views of the masses or the 
proletariat into policy making and legal work.88 
Formal and elaborate legal institutions were eschewed in favor of the informal and direct campaign method 
that had catapulted Mao to power. Chiefly, Mao held a strong anti-bureaucratic bias and preferred localized 
means of preserving social order based on mediation, education, criticism, and flexibility in conducting 
political-legal matters.89 Primarily, CCP leaders wanted to sustain their objective of building a people-oriented 
socialist government that sustained contact with its mass rural base.90 Critically, Mao believed that an 
overarching legal structure and detailed penal codes were unnecessary and that the Party could mobilize and 
marshal individuals to pursue the collectivist goals of the newly created Chinese state. Put another way, one 
could argue that Mao seemed to have more faith in socialist li or socialist morality, instead of fa or state backed 
positive law. The similarity between Confucian and socialist morality is particularly striking because both 
systems relied heavily on “persuasion and education rather than on force, and upon the use of social pressure 
rather than governmental power.”91 As in the Confucian social order, class status and privilege were important 
in determining sanctions in the Maoist social order, but now the economic hierarchy was reversed. 
The class backgrounds of peasants and rural workers were highly privileged over other economic groups, 
especially landowners, capitalists, and petty bourgeois. Overt class-based character and the mass-line campaign 
approach was an idiosyncratic feature of the communist legal structure. Law was viewed as a social tool to 
make the masses “conform to the communist-party-dictated policies.”92 Study and practice of law was not 
considered to be a “major social achievement and a symbol of rectitude,” instead it was considered to be a 
regrettable necessity.93 Chinese legal theory developed during the Mao era viewed “law as tool of the ruling 
class placed in the service of politics and rejected sharp differentiation among judicial, legal, and administrative 
processes.”94 Principally, law was regarded as an instrument of state power to regulate the behavior of 
individuals who had not submitted to other means of social control. In the Western legal systems, law is 
considered to be a set of authoritative rules legislated by the state through the political process. These rules are 
understood and relied upon by legal professionals in the conduct of social, political, and economic affairs: for 
deploying judgments against individuals who commit crimes, for settling disputes in the society, and for settling 
any disputes between the state and the individual. In the Western context, application of law is divorced from 
day-to-day political vicissitudes and the judiciary functions independently without direct interference from 
political leaders. There is a distinct demarcation among the different branches of the government: framers of 
law (legislators), enforcers of law (police), and interpreters of law (the judiciary). The judicial branch is charged 
with application and interpretation of law based on jurisprudence and on the merits of each case presented to the 
court. During the Mao era there was no separation between Party and State, and there was little institutional 
autonomy among framers, enforcers, and interpreters of law.95 Formal separation and independence among the 
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different agencies of the government were thought to be unnecessary. Shen Chün-ju, the former President of the 
Supreme People’s Court, suggested that law and judicial work “must serve political ends,” and it “must be 
brought to bear on current political tasks.”96 Law and politics during Mao’s rule became inseparable from one 
another philosophically, institutionally, and operationally. As Victor Li puts it, China’s communist leaders 
failed to understand the importance, nature, and utility of law in developing a robust society.97 
From 1953 to 1957, there was a brief flurry of experimentation in the development of constitutional and 
juridical models. But, this development came to an abrupt end with the launch of the Anti-Rightist campaign to 
counter the growing criticisms from the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Legal reforms and institutional 
development suffered a serious setback with the launching of the Anti-Rightist campaign and it worsened with 
the inauguration of the Cultural Revolution. At the start of the Cultural Revolution, Mao called for kung-chien-
fa—a complete smash of public security, procuratorate, and judicial organs.98 In addition, Mao also called on 
the nation to “depend on the rule of man, not the rule of law.”99 Legal institutions such as the Ministry of Justice 
and the Procuratorate were abolished, and the courts functioned sparingly. The CCP increasingly relied on 
revolutionary committees and the military to conduct mass trials, public judgment meetings, and struggle 
sessions.100 Establishment of “joint-work groups” and the running of local study-groups allowed the Party to 
control all aspects of law-making and law-enforcement operations. Party cadres relied on their personal 
discretion to sentence individuals to reform by labor.101 
In the West, it is generally understood that a legal system should be devised in such a manner that its 
primary task is to determine validity of individual claims (or rights) against other individuals and those between 
the state and the individual. Such a conception of law in China, especially during the peak of Mao’s rule, was 
considered to be “rightist heresy”102 or “bourgeois law,” which was inconsistent with the principles and goals of 
the socialist system.103 Red Guards attacked the bourgeois system of “equal justice” and the idea of providing 
defense counsel or rights of formal legal representation to every individual. The Guards succeeded in launching 
vitriolic broadsides against counter-revolutionaries for opposing the supremacy of the Party over all matters of 
state policy. The Cultural Revolution was a period of unrestrained radicalism. Formal legal bureaucracy was 
completely destroyed, legal publications were suspended, and legal scholars and jurists were either forced 
underground or banished to labor camps for reeducation.104 
Four basic characteristics defined the Maoist legal structure. First, class background determined the guilt of 
individuals before the law. Second, law was treated as a tool of social engineering and mass mobilization. 
Third, formal legal institutional structure was thought to be wasteful, bureaucratic, and alienating. Fourth, legal 
work was thought to be ideologically inseparable from the political process. Mao’s word overrode the written 
Constitution and other legal documents. His position within the communist empire and his word was similar to 
imperial Chinese emperors, wherein rulers were considered to be above the law and their word represented the 
will of the state. Despite various political upheavals, leadership changes, and ideological revolutions, one of the 
most remarkable features of Chinese civilization is its administrative continuity. An overarching and 
unimpeachable political authority always enforced public order.105 Chairman Mao governed by relying on a 
mixture of “neo-legalism” and “neo-Confucianism.”106 Much like the earlier imperial dynasties, the Maoist 
legal apparatus functioned primarily as a penal tool of regulation. But, more importantly, under Mao’s 
chairmanship, legal order assumed an extra-judicial disposition and a doctrinal character. Communist China 
under Mao reverted back to its imperial heritage in which the emperor ruled by fiat. 
The Concept of Individual Rights in Revolutionary China 
Socialist and Maoist thought mixed with historical Confucianism constitute significant influences in the design 
of domestic law in China. Communist China placed enormous emphasis on the idea of collective interests and 
stressed the role of collectivism in addressing the welfare needs of its citizens. The communist regime believed 
that individual rights and interests needed to be subordinated to the wishes of the party-state.107 The CCP took it 
upon itself to promote proper modes of behavior not through the establishment of a legal system, but through 
relying on mass propaganda. Chinese nationals were expected to learn socialist morality and internalize values 
and norms propagated by the CCP and faithfully follow them.108 When internalization failed, social pressure 
was exercised and when social pressure failed, enforcement was handled at the community level.109 However, 
unfortunately the boundaries separating learning, internalization, exertion of social pressure, and communal 
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enforcement often collapsed onto each other. Formal separation of these socio-legal processes existed only in 
discourse. The excessive importance placed on collective interests reflected the influence of Confucian thought 
on the development of the Chinese legal system. Notions of law and order contained in communism were 
analogous to Confucianism because both privileged collective welfare over individual rights, and favored the 
state over the individual.110 More importantly, it was believed that collective welfare could only emerge if 
individual rights and freedoms are subordinated to the objectives of the party-state. 
Every version of the constitution of the People’s Republic contained a clause that points out that the 
exercise of rights by citizens of China “may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society, and of the 
collective.”111 This article further stipulates that the PRC government may at any time suspend the practice of 
individual rights, if such rights are perceived to be detrimental to the interests of the state and realization of 
collective welfare.112 Exercise of individual rights is permitted only as long as it does not threaten collective 
interests as identified by the party-state. According to Confucianism, exercise of rights must be governed by its 
essential goodness of purpose determined by personal morality. However, under the communist system, 
boundaries of right and wrong were loosely demarcated and the parameters of “right” and “wrong” were 
continually modified without any advance warning. The element of choice offered by Confucian ethocracy was 
completely amputated in the communist social order. 
Various Chinese constitutions give absolute authority to the CCP because the party-state alone was thought 
to have the right to determine and define both collective and individual interests.113 Emphasis was laid on “class 
struggle” and rights were accorded only to the proletariat and other class allies; class opponents such as feudal 
landlords and bureaucratic capitalists were to be attacked and denied any rights because their actions were 
considered to be in opposition to collective welfare.114 Similar to the Confucian system, which emphasized 
collective interests over personal objectives, the communitarian objectives of the Party viewed collective goals 
to be of paramount importance. In fact, to have too much liberty or rights was considered to be harmful to the 
individual and society because it had the potential to produce social disharmony.115 But, the idea of collective 
interests promoted by Mao was much more rigid and narrow compared to Confucian social order. 
Under Mao, the Party dominated every aspect of social and political life and it retained the power to grant 
and withdraw rights as it pleased.116 During the Anti-Rightist Campaign and Cultural Revolution, party elders 
exercised extraordinary and arbitrary power over ordinary Chinese through the coercive mechanisms of the 
state. In particular, the Communist Party systematically identified and punished those thought to be pursuing 
individual interests over the interests of the collective through re-education camps, hard labor, and intense 
sessions of self-criticism. The concept of “individual rights” was fundamentally incompatible with Mao’s 
China. Unlike liberalism, which propounds that “individual rights” are fundamental and inalienable and that 
they are grounded in the innate moral worth of the individual, Chinese intellectuals refute the idea of natural 
rights and innate rights of the individual.117 Chinese discourse on individual rights does not concur with the idea 
that rights are individualistic, innate, and natural.118 In the Confucian ethocracy, an individual’s worth is 
determined by his or her social role and contribution to the society, whereas according to Maoist orthodoxy, 
rights can be only conferred or granted by the state.119 Confucian social order, however, allowed more 
freedoms, mainly in the area of personal attire, accumulation of wealth and property, art and music, and in other 
areas of social life as long as the supremacy of the emperor was not challenged and taxes were regularly paid. 
During Mao’s rule, every form of individuality and economic choice was subordinated to the prevailing state 
ideology. Every right, every action, and every thought flowed from the state; from 1949–1979 the Chinese state 
developed into a domineering institution enveloping all aspects of social, economic, and political life. 
Communist China and International Law 
Imperial China’s complicated relationship with international law and PR China’s doctrinal assessment of law as 
an instrument of suppression by the dominant classes led the People’s Republic to assume an antagonistic 
position towards international law and international organizations. But Communist China’s leaders were savvy 
enough to realize that they could not afford to completely dismiss international law or isolate themselves as the 
Qing mandarins once did. Mao eagerly sought PR China’s formal international legal recognition by other 
nations.120 Chiefly, CCP leadership grasped the utility and importance of depending on international law to 
address numerous outstanding territorial and border issues with its neighboring states. The official CCP position 
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towards international law was an amalgam of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism accompanied by resurgent 
nationalism, and strong articulation of state sovereignty, which reflected the prevailing political mood within 
China.121 The Chinese view of international law concurred with the Soviet model, which characterized 
international law as a special branch of law that expresses “the agreed will of a number of states,” which should 
seek to promote foreign policy and national objectives of the state.122 
At the level of day-to-day diplomatic action, China recognized the existence of international law and it 
relied on international law to conduct routine external relations such as exchange of foreign counsel, diplomatic 
missions, bilateral treaties, and consular activities. References to international law were included in translated 
legal texts; the People’s Republic condemned the actions of other states employing international law; it relied 
on international law to resolve territorial disputes with its neighbors and other states; and offered courses in 
international law in institutes of higher learning.123 But the Chinese government was especially wary of 
customary international law and expressed strong reservations regarding the universality, generality, and 
applicability of international law to all situations; hence, international relations were almost exclusively 
conducted through treaty-based law.124 International law was perceived as an instrument to settle differences 
among nation-states and provide a protocol for conducting mutual business.125 Doctrinally speaking, however, 
international law presented a special challenge because China’s Soviet-trained foreign policy analysts and legal 
scholars had trouble accepting the fact that international law was universal and that the same set of laws 
governed relations among socialist and capitalist countries. 126 Chinese academics such as Lin Hsin, Ho Wu-
Shuang, and Ma Chun suggested that international law should be separated into “bourgeois law” applicable only 
to capitalist countries and “socialist international law” applicable only to relations governing socialist states.127 
China’s legal thinkers argued that international law as practiced by the Western powers was bourgeois in 
character and that it was a tool of the capitalist, which had no place among socialist nations that followed the 
science of proletarian international law aimed at ameliorating the welfare of struggling masses.128 
Revolutionary China’s new leaders harbored deep skepticism about international law because of the 
historical experience with unequal treaties, colonialism, and apprehension that international law was being 
deployed as an imperialist tool to influence China’s socialist character.129 Expansion and deepening of 
international law was characterized as a cynical attempt by Western powers to expand their class interests, 
acquire new territory, and oppress emerging nations.130 Chinese scholars argued that relations among states 
should be determined on the basis of absolute sovereignty, true equality, and complete non-interference in 
internal affairs.131 In various international forums China’s diplomats proclaimed the importance of respecting 
the sanctity of national sovereignty and free will of all states to determine their political, legal, and economic 
systems without external interference. 
Human rights regimes promoted by Western nations, especially by the United States, and its excessive 
emphasis on civil and political rights and individual liberty were perceived as a deliberate policy of targeted 
hostility towards China. During the peak of Chairman Mao’s rule, human rights vocabulary completely 
disappeared from public discourse in China.132 The Party dismissed international human rights “as a bourgeois 
slogan,” which lacked any relevance to socialist objectives.133 Party elders rejected the universality of human 
rights norms. This rejectionist policy was in many ways similar to other post-colonial nations, which also 
gravitated towards socialism, communism, and state-centered developmentalism accompanied by strident 
nationalism, anti-colonial rhetoric, and denunciation of capitalism. 
In Mao’s China, party and state meshed together as the central institution representing the collective 
interests and common will of the people; CCP ideologues believed that economic, political, and social 
development could be sustained only by the state, which was indistinguishable from the Communist Party. 
Individuals who privileged personal gains over collective welfare were chastised as counter-revolutionaries 
seeking to subvert communitarian objectives of the state. Subversion of communitarian goals was a punishable 
offense and the state declared that it had the right to “discipline” anyone seeking to challenge its pre-eminence. 
The collectivist ideals drawn from Marxist and Maoist teachings were easily reflected in China’s rejectionist 
and isolationist international posture and resonated through its anti-Western and anti-colonial pronouncements. 
People’s Republic of China became an ardent advocate for communist and socialist regimes in the developing 
world. 
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International human rights law, which seeks to regulate relations among individuals within the territorial 
jurisdiction of a state, and relations between individuals and the state, has been particularly problematic for 
China. Notably, the disproportionate emphasis of the Western powers on the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) was viewed as a political ploy to gradually dismantle the communal ideals of the 
Chinese state. The Chinese government also adopted a dualist position towards international law, in which 
municipal (domestic) law and international law are said to operate in mutually independent domains without 
any formal influence on each other. Endorsement of the dualist position on international law enabled Chinese 
diplomats to argue that international human rights did not have any locus standi or bearing on its internal laws 
of China because they functioned in two separate spheres of influence. 
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PART FIVE 
Economic Reform and China’s Participation in Human Rights Conventions 
 
Key events that occurred in the middle of 1970s elicited increasing international scrutiny of China’s human 
rights policies. The death of Mao Zedong in 1976, subsequent arrest of the “gang of four,” and return of Deng 
Xiaoping to power signified a critical turning point in modern Chinese history.134 Mao’s death and the capture 
of the “gang of four” increased the flow of information emerging from China, which chronicled the excesses 
and gross human rights abuses committed during the Cultural Revolution.135 Furthermore, rehabilitation of 
political prisoners who suffered during the Cultural Revolution generated renewed enthusiasm in restructuring 
the Chinese legal system.  This culminated in the adoption of a new Constitution in 1978, which significantly 
modified the radical tone of the 1975 Constitution. A new criminal code was also promulgated in 1979.136 Deng 
Xiaoping initiated a process of economic modernization, which encouraged private accumulation of wealth and 
individual property ownership. In addition, the state began to divest its holdings in certain industrial sectors. 
During the early part of the 1970s, human rights emerged as a major global policy issue accompanied by 
democratization and economic liberalization. The United Nations made human rights a dominant theme with 
the creation of the Sub-Commission of Human Rights. Moreover, the United States under the Reagan 
Administration (1980-1988) began a campaign to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights in an effort 
to influence communist regimes in Eastern Europe and in the developing world. Earlier, the Carter 
Administration (1976-1980) had made human rights a central component of American foreign policy. In 1979, 
the United States Department of State began publishing its Annual Report on Human Rights and China featured 
prominently in many of these reports as a country with a poor human rights record. China’s human rights 
practices also attracted the attention of non-governmental human rights organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty 
International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Human Rights In China (HRIC).137 Simultaneously, 
Beijing also demonstrated a renewed interest in breaking out of its self-imposed isolation. It began by 
establishing diplomatic ties with the United States and many other countries, while joining different human 
rights bodies in the United Nations. 
In the early 1980s, China started to join major human rights conventions, such as the Torture Convention 
that China ratified in 1988, less than a year before the Tiananmen Square massacre. During the decade of the 
1980s, China signed and/or ratified seven different human rights treaties (see Table 1). This change in behavior 
towards the human rights regimes seemed to coincide with reformist economic policies introduced by Deng 
Xiaoping. In addition, these efforts were aimed at placating international criticism, while simultaneously 
deepening China’s economic reform for which the country required international assistance. The reorganization 
of the economy, de-regulation of state ownership, and steady inflow of foreign direct investment produced a 
series of interactions that caused unintended consequences for the Chinese legal system and impacted the 
human rights discourse in China. Economic liberalization had an inevitable impact on the political structure 
because introduction of the free-market economic model, however restrained, led to greater emphasis on 
individual freedoms in economic decision-making rather than on collective welfare and selflessness, which 
were the long-standing ideological underpinnings of the Communist Party.138 
Economic liberalization, nevertheless, did not automatically translate into greater political openness or an 
increase in civil liberties for Chinese citizens. According to Article 51 of the 1978 and amended 1982 
Constitutions, the Party still retained the ultimate authority to grant and rescind “rights” as it deemed 
appropriate.139 Both Mao and Deng were equally fearful of any organized dissent, newspaper articles critical of 
CCP rule, and activities that contradicted or questioned the usefulness of the public policies.140 Formal 
expressions of dissent particularly in public spaces were viewed with the same apprehension and alarm that the 
Democracy Wall movement (1978-1980) encountered. The period from 1978 to 1982 was an intellectually 
vibrant period because the Democracy Wall movement spawned a serious debate on China’s political future. 
The Deng government was intolerant of criticisms and in many ways encouraged the democracy movement to 
spread only because it allowed Deng to use the protests to oust Mao loyalists and old guard conservatives, 
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consolidate his own power within the Party, and promote his vision for China’s modernization. Deng referred to 
his reform policies as the “four modernizations,” which involved the modernization of agriculture, industry, 
science and technology, and the military.141 However, when Wei Jingsheng, a Beijing electrician, wrote an 
article titled What Do We Want: Democracy or a New Dictatorship in which he criticized Deng Xiaoping 
pointedly, the Democracy Wall movement crossed a critical threshold.142 Democracy activism was permitted as 
long as it suited Deng’s attempt to consolidate his political power, but when the movement turned against Deng, 
it became a threat to his policies and political survival.143 Therefore, Vice-Premier Deng did not hesitate to 
crush the Democracy Wall movement and re-assert his political authority. 
 
Table 1: Human Rights Conventions Signed and Ratified by China 
 
  Signed Ratified 
1 Convention on Civil and Political Rights Oct 05, 1998 No 
2 Genocide Convention Jul 20, 1949 Apr 18, 1983 
3 Convention on the Status of Refugees No Sep 24,1982 
4 Convention on the Political Rights of Women  No No 
5 Amended Slavery Convention No No 
6 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons No Sep 24,1982 
7 Supplement to the Slavery Convention  No No 
8 Convention on Consent to Marriage & Minimum Age No No 
9 Optional Protocol on Civil and Political Rights No No 
10 Convention on Economic and Social Rights Oct 27, 1997 Mar 27, 2001 
11 Convention on Racial Discrimination No Dec 29, 1981 
12 Convention on Torture  Dec 12, 1986 Oct 04, 1988 
13 Convention on Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations No No 
14 Convention on the Elimination of Apartheid No Apr 18, 1983 
15 Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Jul 17, 1980 Nov 04, 1980 
16 Second Optional Protocol on Abolition of Death Penalty No No 
17 Convention on the Rights of the Child Aug 29, 1990 Mar 02, 1992 
18 Convention on the Sale of Children Sep 06, 2000 No 
19 Convention on Rights of the Child in Armed Conflict No No 
20 Rome Statute International Criminal Court (ICC) No No 
Source: Data gathered from United Nations Treaty Index and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Data accurate as of 2005) 
 
Viewed through the Confucian moral prism, the democracy activists had crossed the moral barrier that 
divided good from bad, which opened them to sanctions from the state. Deng believed in four basic principles: 
(1) economic development and political stability should be the primary goal of the nation; (2) only the Party has 
the ability and capacity to lead China to success; (3) the authority and legitimacy of the Party are supreme; (4) 
and Western-style democracy is unsuitable and unworkable in the Chinese political context.144 Deng’s 
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principles formed the basis of China’s new reform policies, which placed paramount importance on economic 
welfare and subsistence rights over civil and political liberties. Achievement of economic welfare was 
considered to be the necessary first step towards the realization of political or individual rights. According to the 
White Paper on Human Rights published by the PRC government, “safeguarding and promotion of the people’s 
rights to subsistence and development” is the principal human rights concern.145 Hence, economic welfare takes 
precedence over all other rights. Democracy was conceptualized as socialist democracy that emphasized the 
collective aspirations of the people and the nation. Individual rights, political freedom, and democracy were 
portrayed as bourgeois rights that are inconsistent with the aspirations of the Chinese people.146 
The Democracy Wall movement, unlike the other democracy movements such as the short-lived and 
spontaneous effort to commemorate and mourn the death of Zhou Enlai in 1975, was one of the few efforts that 
continued for a relatively long period of time largely because it suited the political goals of the Party. However, 
other freedom and democracy movements that emerged after 1983, including the massive Tiananmen Square 
gathering in 1989, were ruthlessly put down because all these movements constituted direct challenges to the 
supremacy of the Communist Party of China and the set of elite leaders who control the party. Today, however, 
Chinese citizens enjoy unparalleled personal freedoms both in economic and social arenas, but civil and 
political liberties and judicial rights still remain seriously circumscribed.  
Human Rights and Rule-of-Law: International Pressure Linkages 
After Deng’s assumption of power in 1978, China’s record on human rights was subordinated to Cold War 
politics.147 China’s support in the United Nations was crucial to counter-balance the Soviet Union and its 
satellite states. Besides, China was engaging in active human rights diplomacy by playing off the United States 
and the Soviet Union against each other. China entered a series of human rights treaties in the 1980s, and it also 
participated in the United Nations multilateral human rights monitoring efforts by joining the UN Human 
Rights Commission (see Table 1). In 1984, China nominated a representative to serve in the panel of experts of 
the Sub-Commission of Human Rights on the Prevention of Racial Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.148 Moreover, China supported the UN resolution for sending a special human rights monitoring 
group to Afghanistan. Despite protests from the former Soviet Union, it also endorsed the move to investigate 
human rights violations in Chile.149 China also shifted its strategy from absenting to abstaining when human 
rights issues came up for a vote in the UN General Assembly.150 
Since China’s entry into the United Nations Human Rights Commission in the early 1980s, Chinese 
diplomats have diligently attended almost every session of the Human Rights Commission and the Sub-
Commission.151 During these meetings, China’s human rights concerns largely centered on issues such as the 
right to self-determination, elimination of racial discrimination, and discrimination against women.152 The 
primary task of Chinese diplomats attending these sessions was to represent the official Chinese position on 
human rights, which was often at odds with the broader human rights discourse because it focused intently on 
the issue of individual rights and on guaranteeing physical integrity of the human being.153 Although China 
seemed to recognize the international legitimacy of UN human rights organizations, it expressed considerable 
reservation over what it characterized as the politicization of human rights, expressed concerns about erosion of 
state sovereignty, and chided Western powers for their excessive focus on civil and political rights and their 
attempts to push these rights upon developing nations.154 
Chinese diplomats have registered strong objections over the interference of international human rights 
organizations into the internal matters of sovereign states. Specifically, the Chinese government has consistently 
objected to the United Nations’ policy of incorporating NGO reports into formal UN reports produced by the 
Human Rights Commission. It has expressed deep concerns regarding how human rights NGOs operating 
through a network of informants inside China were able to gather information about human rights practices, 
embarrassing the Chinese government in international forums. Mainly, Chinese diplomats are particularly 
distressed that the UN has accepted the veracity and authenticity of these reports in effect chastising China’s 
human rights policies in formal UN publications and in other public forums by relying on data gathered through 
unofficial sources. 
Both at the domestic and international levels, China’s human rights policies have reflected Deng’s 
philosophy of maintaining the dominance of the Communist Party. Punishing dissidents and criminals without 
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any regard for their human rights is considered to be within the prerogative of the Chinese state. At the domestic 
level, a citizen-led democracy reform movement was allowed to flower for a few years as this policy suited the 
purposes of the ruling elite. In fact, the domestic human rights and democracy movement was manipulated to 
discredit Mao loyalists and isolate them from centers of power. At the international level, as long as attention 
was primarily focused on the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, criticism of China’s human rights 
policies did not attract much international attention. However, Chinese human rights practices during the post-
Mao era have received much international scrutiny as the government began the process of engaging with select 
multilateral human rights treaties (see Table 1), accompanied by an ambitious task of overhauling its domestic 
legal system. It is difficult to identify explicitly the correlative impact of China’s entry into international human 
rights treaties and trace the corresponding impact on the domestic legal system. However, undoubtedly the 
Party leadership has taken significant steps to modify the domestic legal system since 1978 without derogating 
the autonomy or the supremacy of the Communist Party. 
Saving Face and Cultural Sensitivity to Foreign Criticism 
China invariably reacts very harshly with counter-criticism if its human rights practices are attacked in 
international forums.155 Addressing an international conference on human rights in 1993, the former Vice-
Foreign Minister, Liu Huaqiu rejected foreign criticism by arguing that to “wantonly accuse another country of 
abuse of human rights and impose the human rights criteria of one’s own…is tantamount to an infringement 
upon the sovereignty” of the Chinese nation.156 Minister Huaqiu, further added that interference in internal 
matters “could result in political instability and unrest” in China—a concern repeatedly asserted by all Chinese 
officials. Similarly, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin issued numerous public statements expressing his 
strong resentment of foreign interference in internal matters in the name of human rights.157 Although all of the 
post-Mao leaders have unquestionably increased their engagement with human rights regimes, they have 
consistently held that China’s domestic politics is beyond the purview of other states or international 
organizations. Imposition of draconian legal sanctions is regarded entirely as a domestic matter, and individuals 
held in prisons are given no rights because the government argues that prisoners abrogate such rights when they 
engage in criminal acts; rights are only accorded to law-abiding citizens. Human rights in the Chinese context 
refer to collective interests aimed at improving the communal welfare. Since the strike-hard anti-crime 
campaigns target drug peddlers, looters, prostitutes, pimps, corrupt bureaucrats, and counter-revolutionaries, the 
state, after all, is protecting the rights and interests of the collective. Officials in the Bureau of Public Security 
contend that China has a serious crime problem, especially in major cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, and other 
major cities clustered along the South China Coast. Therefore, Public Security officials contend that it is 
necessary to rely on deterrent counter-strikes and demonstrate the state is able to maintain law, order, and 
stability.158 Although this logic seems to be consistent with Chinese views on law and rights, it is distinctly 
different from the generally accepted interpretation of universal human rights promoted by the United Nations. 
This stark difference in the interpretation of international human rights norms has produced the so-called 
universalist versus cultural relativist debate.159 The Chinese position on human rights falls under the relativist 
category. According to this argument, each country’s human rights norms are determined by its unique 
historical and cultural experiences, and by the constraints placed on its institutional structure. In other words, 
the Chinese government explicitly denies the existence of any “universal human rights or legal norms” that are 
applicable to all countries in a homogeneous manner. Chinese authorities dismiss the idea of universal human 
rights “as an imperialist manifestation of a hypocritical West.”160 The Chinese government believes that its 
domestic activities are beyond the influence of external authorities, and that China is within its sovereign right 
to define “rights” and “wrongs” according to internally-generated rules, and then impose sanctions that it 
considers to be appropriate and justified within the domestic context. Rejection of international human rights 
norms is primarily driven by a combination of powerful historical and contemporary forces; namely, historical 
humiliations suffered by the Qing dynasty during the period of unequal treaties, and civil wars during the post-
Qing era instigated by Western colonists, coupled with anti-internationalist Marxist ideology and resurgent 
nationalism energized by the Communist Party. 
During the rule of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, human rights conditions in China improved moderately 
compared to earlier periods; millions of political prisoners from the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated, the 
class-system that privileged the proletariat was abolished, and Chinese citizens began to enjoy broad economic 
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and personal freedoms.161 However, in the post-Mao era, efforts to create a functioning and independent legal 
system has not fully succeeded because of the concern among CCP officials that law might be used by 
“autonomous entities” to protect the interests of vested groups opposed to the Party.162 Hence, China’s criminal 
laws have been purposefully designed to be vague, internally inconsistent, and contradictory.163 The courts and 
the legal system in China are regarded as tools to reaffirm the authority of the state; they are not regarded as 
institutions to protect citizens from the tyranny of the state or mediate relations among citizens.164 There is great 
reluctance to introduce true reform in the criminal legal system because of the fear that it will effectively cede 
control over critical sectors of the government, which might conceivably lead to chaos (luan) and displace the 
Communist Party as the central political force and organizing authority, impairing the economic reform process. 
The fear of chaos (luan) or turmoil is prominent among CCP leadership. During discussions among party 
leaders—Li Peng, Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, and Bo Yibo—to determine a 
course of action to deal with the June 4th Beijing Democracy Movement in 1989, Deng repeatedly invoked the 
words “chaos and turmoil,” and forcibly argued that stability should be achieved at any cost. 
Deng’s concerns of “chaos and turmoil” were also subsequently expressed by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, 
illustrating that the issue of political instability is of such sustained importance to the party leadership that they 
are willing to do anything to quell any challenges perceived or real to the paramount position of the Communist 
Party. Former Premier Li Peng and President Jiang Zemin justified the imposition of martial law as the 
Tiananmen protests grew in size and strength because they were concerned that instability would be transmitted 
to other areas.165 They echoed Deng’s belief that resolutions condemning China or the imposition of 
international sanctions are “no big deal for us.”166 The Chinese Politburo has always vociferously asserted that 
China should either ignore the threat of international sanctions or fight back, but never allow other countries to 
interfere in its internal political matters. China’s fourth generation leaders, led by president Hu Jintao, have 
continued the policy of maintaining the supremacy of the Communist Party while managing citizen demands, 
suppressing dissent, and controlling political activity, but this policy has not had meaningful impact on China’s 
human rights practices as the following sections will demonstrate. 
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PART SIX 
Political Order and Human Rights in Post-Revolutionary China 
 
The June 4th Tiananmen Square protests were a product of limited political and partial economic reforms 
initiated by Deng. These reforms provided some political space for open intellectual debate on the issue of 
democracy and freedom within China in the 1980s, as long as the discussions did not explicitly criticize the 
Party, its policies, or its leaders. Simultaneously, the economic reforms, which were implemented in an uneven 
fashion, led to widespread corruption, accentuated the differences between rich and poor, and increased 
resentment and discontentment among large groups of people. These popular frustrations manifested themselves 
in the form of small student protests beginning in April 1989, which increased in size with every passing day, 
before the movement was decisively crushed by the first week of June 1989. When the reform process 
threatened to overturn the legitimacy and power of the Communist Party, Vice-Premier Deng did not hesitate to 
extinguish the democracy movement. Overthrow of the Communist Party was not the goal of the June 4th 
democracy protesters; the objective of the various student groups was aimed at pushing the government to 
extend the benefits of economic reform to all sections of the population and seek greater citizen input in the 
public policy-making process.167 However, ideological contradictions within the higher echelons of the Party 
over the direction and limits of reform, and the unwillingness to fully reform all sectors of the economic and 
political system generated social forces that choked the reform process, which eventually culminated in the June 
4th movement. 
In the post-Mao reform period, Vice-Premier Deng promoted his “Four Cardinal Principles.” These 
principles called for the continuation of the socialist road and re-emphasized the importance of maintaining the 
dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeois, continuing the doctrinal commitment to Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism, and upholding faith in the paramount leadership of the Communist Party. These “Four Cardinal 
Principles” were considered to be the cornerstone of China’s post-Mao reform policy, but they seemed 
fundamentally contradictory. Neither Deng nor his followers ever really fully explicated or sought to resolve 
these contradictions. Deng’s slogan “to get rich is glorious” seemed inconsistent with some of the cardinal 
principles that he had outlined earlier.168 
Economic ideas such as reducing the share of the public sector in industrial activities, dismantling 
collective agricultural communes, and supporting private accumulation of property ran counter to the principle 
of maintaining the socialist path, continuing the dictatorship of the masses over the elite, and sustaining the 
commitment to Maoism. Once the reform process was underway, the value and importance of Maoism 
markedly declined, except among hard-core loyalists. Petty bourgeois, entrepreneurs, and landlords, who were 
completely wiped out during the Mao era, rapidly reappeared.169 The slogan of proletarian dictatorship over the 
bourgeois quickly disappeared from official policy discourse because every proletarian wanted to become a 
capitalist.170 Lastly, the idea of free-market economy in which forces of supply and demand determined 
commodity prices seemed inconsistent with the principle of following the socialist road as promulgated by 
Deng. Development with “socialist or Chinese characteristics” did not translate very effectively into practice, 
except that it hampered the pace of economic reforms, and inspired the Tiananmen democracy protests. The 
hard-line Communist Party elites hampered the economic reform process because of their strong motivation to 
maintain control and dominance over all areas of social, economic, and political life. Internal political debate 
within the party during Deng’s rule centered on controlling the pace of economic reform and the degree to 
which the party needs to exercise control over the reform process. Two factions sought control of the reform 
movement during Deng’s rule—the Deng loyalists and the Chen Yun Group. The Deng faction favored broad-
based and expansive economic reforms, while the Chen Yun group called for a more conservative pace of 
reform, tighter management and control of the reform process by the party, and continued commitment to 
socialist thought.171 Socialist ideals did not translate into any meaningful policy solutions, but it did influence 
the pace and scope of the reforms. 
After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Deng’s power significantly weakened. Some members of the 
Politburo and the Standing Committee, the two leading political organs, believed that reforms needed to be 
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curtailed and that the state should maintain greater control over the reform process. The Chinese leadership 
strongly believed in the luan scenario, especially after witnessing the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
the wake of radical political and economic reforms launched by Mikhail Gorbachev. The breakup of the Soviet 
Union convinced Party elders that if the reforms were not properly managed, China would disintegrate. Hence, 
disproportionate importance was placed on maintaining political stability while relaxing economic controls. 
Deng Xiaoping favored strong punishments for the June 4th demonstrators.  Above all, the Vice-Premier 
believed that punishments should specifically target leadership elements within the June 4th movement. In 
addition, Deng argued that post-Tiananmen laws should be structured in a very careful manner, especially laws 
governing “assembly, association, marches, demonstrations, journalism, and publishing.”172 He believed that 
such strong measures were necessary to make both external and internal actors understand that the Chinese 
government was “tightening controls for the sake of stability,” and for the “sake of reform and opening and 
modern construction.”173 
Deng personally selected the former Mayor of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin, to the Chairmanship of the Chinese 
Communist Party to continue the reform process and ensure stability during the political transition. Jiang Zemin 
replaced Zhao Zhiyang as the Party Secretary-General in 1989 during the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square 
incident. Zhao Zhiyang was purged from power and arrested for trying to introduce political reforms and for 
sympathizing with student leaders of the democracy movement.174 Jiang Zemin was selected because of his 
ability to manage a market-economy as he had done as the Mayor of Shanghai, his mastery over elite politics, 
and for his ability to maintain political stability and social order. In the Chinese context, stability and social 
order meant that CCP was not going to permit any political activity that challenges the party or its leadership. 
The capability to maintain stability and order was one of the paramount concerns of the Chinese leadership in 
the wake of the Tiananmen Square riots. Hence, under Jiang Zemin’s rule, China continued to pursue economic 
reform and liberalization, while the party began to tighten its control over critical sectors of the state, such as 
media and political institutions. Jiang Zemin single-handedly launched the effort to identify and prosecute the 
Tiananmen student leaders and subsequently began the bloody and brutal crackdown on the Falun Gong 
spiritual movement. 
Similar to the Mao regime, the post-Mao leaders of China did not tolerate any form of organized political 
dissent or criticisms of its policies. The party continues to suppress all direct opposition to its supremacy, but it 
has co-opted vital sectors of the society and improved its strategic alliance with the entrepreneurial class.175 
Since Deng assumed power, the Party has transformed itself from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, while 
the Chinese state has transitioned from a totalitarian communist state into an authoritarian-developmentalist 
state, in which the primary objective is to enable economic prosperity, but also maintain political domination. 
Importantly, during this transition, the CCP shed its socialist ideology and allegiance to Maoism. All of China’s 
post-Mao leaders have made references to socialist ideology and incorporated socialist principles in their formal 
political discourse and public rhetoric, but in practice, socialist ideology has had minimal influence on policy 
matters, especially on economic policy. During Jiang Zemin’s rule, socialist ideals started to disappear from 
formal political announcements and the economic reforms that began in 1978 produced unparalleled economic 
freedoms for the Chinese citizens and engendered one of the greatest economic revivals, catapulting China into 
a major economic power.176 Jiang Zemin’s formal theory of “Three Represents” places more emphasis on the 
“advancement of productive forces.”177 Presently, under Hu Jintao, China has transformed itself into a 
technocratic state and has shed its overt ideological commitments. The country is fully focused on economic 
growth, while the party tightly controls the degree of political openness. 
Reforms and Social Stability—Strike-Hard Campaigns and the Death Penalty 
After the Tiananmen protests were subdued, the coercive apparatus of the state became overt and strong; to 
maintain stability, prevent chaos, and continue with economic reforms, the Chinese government introduced a 
series of law enforcement tools, and defined a wide-range of political and social activities as a national security 
threat. The party-state relied on a variety of repressive measures such as detention without charge or trial, 
supervised residence, shelter and investigation, post-arrest detention, denial of access to lawyers, torture and 
physical duress to extract confessions, presumption of guilt on arrest, witness intimidation, reeducation through 
labor, and imposition of the death penalty to suppress political dissent and control crime.178 
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These coercive instruments are deployed against a broad range of activities such as public protests; printing 
pamphlets; organizing labor groups; participating in demonstrations and rallies; seeking membership in 
unregistered religious groups; and leading, aiding, supporting, and participating in separatist movements 
(largely applied to the autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang). Activities aimed at disturbing peace and 
stability, publishing and distributing seditious or subversive materials, maintaining contact with hostile foreign 
elements, spying, and revealing state secrets are identified as crimes to curtail a range of civil and political 
liberties that might potentially jeopardize the stability of the state. Those thought to engage in these activities 
are branded as “counter-revolutionaries,” or “enemies of the state” for “endangering national security,” and they 
are detained indefinitely and banished to labor camps. In addition to these crimes, harsh penalties are also 
imposed for general social crimes, such as corruption, robbery, rape, drug abuse and trafficking, prostitution, 
and other petty crimes. 
Interestingly enough, the clamp down on the fledgling democracy movement in the early 1980s coincided 
with the start of anti-crime (yanda) campaigns launched in the mid-80s, and it was periodically re-deployed in 
1990, 1996, and 2001.179 The strike-hard campaigns and public sentencing rallies (gonkai xuanpan dahui) 
became a popular legal tool and political tactic to combat unprecedented increase in crime and corruption 
produced by economic reform. The yanda crime-control campaign relied on “mass arrests, swift and harsh 
sentencing, mass rallies, and extensive propaganda work.” 180 One of the signature features of the strike-hard 
campaign was the widespread and indiscriminate use of the death penalty. It is estimated that during these 
strike-hard campaigns, the death penalty led to the deaths of “tens of thousands of people,” and the list of 
offenses punishable by death increased to sixty-eight categories.181 Although Articles 61, 48, 236, and 239 of 
the Chinese Criminal Law specifically limit the application of capital punishment to what is termed as 
“especially aggravated cases,” or “serious circumstances,” there is widespread evidence to indicate that the 
punishment of death is liberally applied to violent and non-violent economic crimes.182 
People’s Republic of China is one of the few countries in the world with a high death penalty/imprisonment 
ratio; more prisoners are executed compared to the size of the total incarcerated population. 183 China has 
consistently topped the list of countries with the highest number of executions, but estimating death penalty 
imposition and actual execution rates is a wild guessing game because official statistics are state secrets.184 
Estimates of average per annum execution figures range from a high of 15,000 to a low of 10,000 per year.185 
An internal report prepared by the office of the Secretary of the Central Politics and Law Committee, Luo Gan, 
who is one of the nine members of the Chinese Politburo (PBSC), estimates that 60,000 people were executed 
between 1998 and 2001.186 According to Chief Justice Xiao Yang, the President of Supreme People’s Court, a 
total of 767,951 criminals were convicted by all of China’s courts in 2004, of which “19.04 percent were 
sentenced to more than five years imprisonment, life imprisonment, and death penalty.”187 In other words, 
146,218 individuals received a sentence of 5 years to life or the death penalty. It is not exactly clear as to what 
percent of the 146,218 received a death sentence. However, even a conservative estimate of 10 percent means 
that at least 14,621 individuals might have been sentenced to death. This number is considerably higher 
compared to one of the most commonly used numbers made available by Amnesty International (AI), which is 
based on estimates generated through eyewitness accounts, other observations of publicized death sentences, 
gathering of news reports from provincial dailies, and informants within the Chinese criminal justice system. 
Amnesty International estimates are rather conservative and flawed at best, but are nevertheless the most 
comprehensive numbers available so far. For instance “group executions” are counted as a “single execution,” 
which vastly underestimates the total number of executions.188 However, even these conservative estimates 
reveal the staggering executions that take place every year in China. If one were to base calculations on the bold 
estimates that put execution rates from 10,000 to 15,000 per annum, then over a 16-year period from 1990 to 
2005 one can extrapolate that anywhere between 160,000 to 240,000 individuals were executed. According to 
some AI estimates, from 1997-2001 at least 15,000 executions were carried out.189 
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Figure 1: Number of Death Sentences Imposed and Actual Executions Carried Out between 1990-2005 in 
the People’s Republic of China 
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Source: Data collected from Amnesty International Annual Reports, China (1990-2005) 
 
Calculations based on estimates gathered from the Annual AI Human Rights Reports put the number of 
death sentences imposed at 2,662 and the average execution rate at 1,625 per year (see Figure 1). By this count, 
42,589 death sentences were imposed and 26,002 executions were carried out from 1990 to 2005. This number 
is significantly lower and demonstrates the challenge of accurately assessing the number of death penalty cases. 
Irrespective of the difficulty of gathering accurate data, the enormity of the death penalty problem is revealed 
even by the conservative estimates that put the average number of executions at about 1,625 per annum. Figure 
1 also suggests that the spikes in the chart for the years 1996, 2001, and 2005 are strongly associated with the 
launch of the strike-hard anti-crime campaigns, which further suggests a direct correlation between the launch 
of anti-crime campaigns and liberal imposition of capital punishment. 
Mostly, the death penalty is deployed as a coercive device; in particular, it serves as a deterrent to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of state power in controlling growing crime and corruption, which ironically 
developed as a result of new spaces created by unfettered economic growth and expanding inequality.190 It is 
employed as a propaganda device to intimidate citizens and carry out education campaigns to establish the 
preponderant power of the state.191 Undoubtedly, imposition of the death penalty is also driven by populism and 
strong public attitudes towards crime, even petty crimes and other utilitarian considerations.192 Local media 
frequently report that the masses often demand a tough response to crime. According to Mao Shulong, a 
Professor of Public Administration in Beijing’s People University, “when the Chinese see a thief, they want him 
beaten to death.”193 There is widespread coverage of death penalty sentences in the local media to demonstrate 
that the state is punishing wrongdoers and simultaneously asserting control over society. 
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Death sentences are carried out very swiftly; often executions are conducted in a stadium or in other public 
places.194 The two most popular methods of execution are death by shooting and death by lethal injection. In the 
case of death by shooting, prisoners are forced to kneel down and shot in the back of the head or neck. 
However, in instances when body parts of the prisoners are harvested appropriate adjustments are made to 
prevent injury to vital organs.195 If a prisoner’s eyes are being harvested, then the point of execution is either the 
neck or the heart. Although harvesting of organs is not specifically forbidden under Chinese law, it is not 
subject to any regulations and does not conform to international standards laid out by the World Health 
Organization.196 In the last few years, in order to increase efficiency and reduce the cost of executions, and also 
make them more humane, prison authorities have shifted to lethal injection as the primary form of execution, 
which includes the use of mobile execution vans.197 In a windowless van, the prisoner is strapped down and 
injected with a lethal drug. The execution can be monitored and recorded through a television set located next to 
the driver’s seat. 
One of the most problematic aspects of Chinese death penalty practice is the arbitrary, indiscriminate and 
gruesome manner in which the death penalty is exercised. Families receive notice only a few days before the 
execution, which gives them very little time to arrange for defense or plead with the authorities, because 
condemned prisoners are executed immediately on conviction.198 Oftentimes bodies of the executed prisoners 
are not returned to the families and executions are performed in main thoroughfares or in public grounds, 
ostensibly to achieve the necessary deterrent effect. Following sentencing, prisoners are routinely paraded 
through the streets on their way to the execution grounds. Placards detailing information regarding their crimes, 
including personal information such as names and place of birth of the shackled prisoners, are placed around 
their necks.199 In addition, photographers and TV crews are invited to take pictures and widely publicize the 
sentencing rallies. Sentencing and execution rallies serve multiple objectives; they demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the provincial governments in striking hard at crime, humiliate and shame the condemned, and 
serve as a warning to the local communities. 
Liberal application of the death penalty without proper judicial safeguards principally results due to the 
lack of transparency, consistency, and independence of the Chinese judicial and penal system. It is not entirely 
clear as to which crimes warrant the imposition of the death penalty and whether persons charged receive 
proper legal representation and right to appeal. According to Article 49 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), 
the death penalty is not applicable to crimes committed by perpetrators under the age of 18 and women who are 
pregnant at the time of trial.200 Otherwise, there are no sentencing guidelines or uniform national standards 
governing the scope of death penalty imposition. As Professor Liu Zuoxiang of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences points out, “due to varied standards, people who commit similar crimes are put to death in some 
provinces, but kept alive in others.”201 Hence, capital punishment is imposed on a wide number of crimes such 
as purse-snatchers in Guangzhou, embezzlement, corruption, various drug related offenses, and high crimes 
such as rape and murder.202 Whether a crime warrants the sanction of death entirely depends on the discretion of 
the provincial courts. 
According to official statistics released by the Supreme People’s Court, all of the Chinese courts were able 
to secure convictions in 99.1 percent of the criminal cases from 1998 to 2002.203 Chinese criminal laws do not 
contain provisions for presumption of guilt or innocence. The guiding legal principles suggest that “all facts” 
must be taken into consideration while arriving at a decision.204 However, since convictions are secured in 
nearly all the cases that come up for trial, there is a natural tendency towards presumption of guilt that 
automatically predisposes the prisoner to condemnation; all the presiding judge has to do is to impose a 
sentence reinforcing the procuracy’s findings.205 Public trials are held only when the court is convinced of the 
guilt of the accused; if the guilt of the accused cannot be established then the trial is adjourned for further 
investigations or the trial is closed to the public.206 Even if the trials are public, family and the counsel of the 
accused are denied entry to such public trials and in many instances not even notified.207 The whole trial process 
is strongly slanted in favor of the prosecution and it is designed to generate a guilty verdict. Courts rarely act as 
independent arbiters of facts and laws; instead they merely function as handmaidens of the police and 
procuratorate in affirming the pre-determined guilty verdict. 
In the Chinese legal system, an adjudication committee that operates independently of the trial court 
determines the verdict in criminal cases. This makes the adjudication committee highly vulnerable to political 
pressure.208 The adjudication committee does not rely on trial proceedings or on the verdict of a jury of peers, 
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but it arrives at decisions entirely on the basis of case files without hearing from the defendant or from the 
defense lawyers. As a consequence, final indictments reflect the original case as presented by government 
prosecutors with very little input from defense lawyers or from the defendant. Moreover, defense lawyers are 
not provided access to case files; they are not allowed to confront prosecution witnesses during court 
proceedings, and they are barred from challenging the verdict of the adjudication committee.209 There is also 
growing evidence that defense lawyers are not allowed to function effectively; they are threatened and 
dissuaded from defending their clients or they are discouraged from defending the accused and pursuing the 
case earnestly. Correspondingly, defense witnesses are persuaded from testifying against the prosecution, and 
defendants are allowed to consult an attorney only seven days before the start of a trial, which effectively 
prevents a successful defense because of insufficient time to make case preparations.210 Three major provisions 
in the Chinese Criminal Law—Article 306 of the Criminal Law, Article 38 of the Criminal Procedure Law, and 
Article 45 of Lawyers Law—permit state criminal prosecutors to arrest lawyers representing individual clients 
on grounds of “perjury,” “fabricating evidence,” providing “false testimony” and “forcing or inciting a witness 
to change testimony.”211 These provisions are used to target Chinese lawyers and transform them into 
defendants instead of legal representatives and limit their capacity to function effectively and independently. 
According to authoritative estimates, more than 100 lawyers have been prosecuted under Article 306 and 307 
since 1997 for the crime of falsification of evidence.212 In particular, lawyers who pursue criminal cases or other 
cases that are deemed to be “sensitive” are specifically targeted for harassment and prosecution. Also the fee for 
retaining a lawyer is highly prohibitive. On average, hiring legal services could cost anywhere between 300 to 
650 dollars, whereas the average income of workers in China is less than 2 dollars a day in the rural areas.213 
Lawyer intimidation and denial of legal counsel are clear violations of Lawyers Law, the revised Criminal 
Procedure Law of 1996, and China’s 1982 Constitution, which states that courts shall operate without 
interference from any political or administrative organization. Yet, political interference seems to be routine 
despite significant developments in the legal profession, law-making, and judicial reform.214 
Arrest, Arbitrary Detention, and Suppression of Dissent 
Political opposition, dissidence, and open religious expression generate a repressive response from the Chinese 
state in the name of maintaining social stability. Every year many individuals are either arrested or indefinitely 
detained for counter-revolutionary activities, which are primarily political crimes.215 These crimes could range 
anywhere from writing subversive poetry to unfurling a banner with a political message in a public square. 
Chinese nationals are also arrested for forming labor unions, complaining about corruption, filing too many 
petitions, and attempting to form political parties or post articles related to human rights and democracy on 
Internet bulletin boards. Overseas Chinese scholars and journalists are harassed and detained or even arrested 
when they visit China to collect research materials on sensitive political topics.216 Censorship, although not 
absolute, is widespread and severely limits freedom of expression, press freedoms, and rights of religious 
expression, all of which are guaranteed by the Convention on Civil and Political Rights signed by China in 
1998. The crackdown on civil and political liberties is largely driven by the Communist Party’s growing 
concern that increasing social instability caused by widening income inequalities and rural unrest will 
potentially threaten the legitimacy of the party and derail China’s peaceful emergence as a superpower.217 The 
CCP’s apprehension over the possibility of large-scale social turmoil became decidedly urgent after the 
Tiananmen democracy movement.  
Immediately following the protests, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a memorandum that was 
circulated to all the local courts. This memorandum instructed the local courts to strictly follow the line 
established by Deng Xiaoping and promptly hand out “severe punishments” to those who are responsible for 
causing “social turmoil” or disturbing social stability.218 Over the last two half decades, the paramount concern 
has been on managing the economic transition of China without allowing any overt challenges to the supremacy 
and legitimacy of the Communist Party. According to official statistics released by the Ministry of Public 
Security, the number of mass-public incidents witnessed a 50 percent jump from 43,500 in 2003 to 87,000 in 
2005.219 Today China encounters three kinds of challenges that could produce social turmoil: (i) ethnic 
separatism in Xinjiang and Tibet, (ii) expanding demands from Chinese citizens seeking freedom of religious 
expression and civil liberties, and (iii) social unrest caused by growing income inequalities both within urban 
areas and between urban and rural districts. 
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In an effort to confront these challenges, the Chinese state relies heavily on Reeducation through Labor 
(laojiao), Reform through Labor (laogai), and Custody and Repatriation (shourong qiansong). 220 With the 
exception of Reform through Labor, which is a form of criminal punishment, Reeducation through Labor is a 
form of administrative sanction that circumvents the formal criminal legal process. Custody and Repatriation is 
a type of warehousing technique used to round up urban homeless, vagabonds, and undocumented migrant 
workers, and hold them in administrative detention until they can pay for their release or they are returned 
home.221 One of the unfortunate outcomes of this detention scheme is that detainees have no rights to legal aid 
and access to justice is exceedingly limited. It is estimated that more than two million people are detained every 
year under Custody and Repatriation. Reeducation through Labor (RTL) has become a widely used tool of 
social control especially after the suspension of the dreaded practice of Custody and Investigation (shourong 
shencha, also known as Shelter and Investigation) because of sustained international pressure.222 
Shelter and Investigation allowed police to hold individuals in custody for three months for suspicion of 
being involved in a crime.223 Although Article 14 of the 1979 Criminal Law forbids such detentions for more 
than ten days without charge, the police, nevertheless, depend excessively on this procedure because Shelter and 
Investigation can be utilized without any judicial review or other legal interference.224 Shelter and Investigation 
was abolished during the 1996 revision of Chinese Criminal Law, but Reeducation through Labor has filled the 
vacuum. RTL is largely directed against two segments of the population: (a) petty criminals, such as drug 
addicts, sex workers, brothel visitors, and other offenders who commit larceny, fraud, and assault, and (b) 
political troublemakers accused of counter revolutionary activities, endangering public security or disturbing 
public order. Generally, the majority of the second group consists of Falun Gong practitioners, and Tibetan and 
Uighur nationalists. According to the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law, the crime of counter-revolution is defined 
as an act that seeks to topple “the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist 
system.”225 In 1994 more than 2,800 people were detained for counter revolutionary offences and in 1995, 
according to the Ministry of Justice, 2,768 people were imprisoned for counter revolutionary activities.226 
Tibetan and Uighur nationalists, pro-democracy activists, leaders of underground churches, and editors of 
independent press are the primary targets of detention under RTL. The PRC government has long equated all 
types of political dissent, open criticisms of the Communist Party, and autonomous religious activity with 
separatism and terrorism.227 Political dissenters are held incommunicado under charges such as “subversion,” 
“incitement to subversion,” “inciting splittism,” and “disturbing public order.”228 The crime of “endangering 
public security” is sufficiently vague so that it provides wide latitude for interpretation such that any words, 
actions, or associations both formal and informal, can be construed as being “disruptive of public order or 
critical of official policies.”229 Leaders of unregistered religious associations and other non-governmental 
organizations who “have contacts with or receive financial support from any organization, within or outside the 
country” can also be detained under RTL because they come under jurisdiction of China’s state security law, 
which makes it a crime for Chinese nationals to have associations with foreigners who endanger national 
security.230 
Under RTL detainees can be held indefinitely without charge or trial, tortured and forced to give false 
confessions, and sent to forced labor camps (laogai) for reformation.231 These detentions are not subject to 
judicial review, and those accused don’t have access to legal assistance and they are not allowed to defend 
themselves.232 Official statistics indicate that 200,000 people were being held in various RTL camps in 1996 
and that number has since increased to 310,000 by 2001.233 
Torture, Ill-Treatment, and Coercive Extraction of Confessions 
PR China was one of the first states to ratify the International Convention on the Prevention of Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Punishments in 1988 (see Table 1) after it was opened for signature. 
However, since the end of the Tiananmen movement, instances of torture and reliance on physical force to 
extract confessions have become systematic. Use of torture and coercion has coincided with the recurrent 
implementation of the strike-hard anti-crime campaign. According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, use of physical pain or torture (kuxing) to extract confessions or coerce statements from detainees is so 
widespread that authorities are not able to clearly distinguish between what is considered as torture and what is 
not.234 Under Article 1 of the Convention on Torture (CAT), “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
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whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” for such purposes as obtaining information, 
seeking confession, and intimidating or coercing a third person “with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official” is prohibited.235 However, instances of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners and arbitrariness in the 
administration of justice is systematic and rampant. Belatedly, Wang Zehnchuan, Deputy Procurator General of 
China, admitted that at least “30 wrong verdicts were handed down each year because torture had been used.”236 
He also acknowledged that the use of torture to extract confessions was so pervasive that it undermined the 
effectiveness of the judicial system.237 
The case of She Xianglin exemplifies the serious troubles confronting the Chinese legal system. Mr. 
Xianglin, a 39-year old man was charged with the murder of his wife, despite the fact that his wife’s body was 
never recovered, and was sentenced to a 15-year prison term. While serving his prison term Mr. Xianglin’s 
murdered wife suddenly re-appeared after an 11-year absence, which forced the central prison in the northern 
Hubei province to quietly release Mr. Xianglin, who in turn sued the state for 4.37 million yuan for his wrongful 
conviction.238 Xianglin’s arrest and conviction was based on confession extracted through torture.239 The case 
took an even murkier turn when Pan Yujun, the investigating police officer charged with arresting and 
wrongfully convicting Xianglin was found hanging by the neck at a graveyard in Hubei province a few months 
after Xianglin’s release; two other police officials involved in the case have since been promoted and moved to 
a different district.240 More than six months after his release and restoration of normal citizenship rights, 
Xianglin is still shadowed by local police officials and prevented from speaking to reporters.241 
In another case of gross miscarriage of justice, Nie Shubin, a 21-year old man, who also hails from Hubei 
province, was executed for rape-murder of a young woman in 1995. Ten years after Nie Shubin’s execution, 
another man, Wang Shujin, was arrested for an unrelated crime and confessed to the police for the rape-murder. 
Since then the Hubei police department has come under heavy scrutiny for overzealous prosecution and 
wrongfully executing Nie Shubin.242 State parties to the Convention on Torture (CAT) are expected to prevent 
the occurrence of such events and implement appropriate legal measures to punish perpetuators of torture in the 
administration of justice. In May 2000 the Committee on Torture—a UN body, which examines compliance 
with the torture convention—recommended that China completely re-structure its criminal law to fully comply 
with the Torture Convention.243 Article 136 of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law prohibits torture to “coerce a 
statement or extract confession” and Article 189 prohibits the use of “corporal punishment and abuse” of 
prisoners.244 Correspondingly, Article 247 of the revised Criminal Procedure Law also forbids “extortion of 
confession under torture by a judicial officer,” and “extraction of testimony by the use of force by a judicial 
officer.” Furthermore, Article 248 abjures “physical abuse of inmates as well as instigation of detainee-on-
detainee violence by policeman or other officer of an institution of confinement like a prison, a detention or 
custody house.”245 The revised Criminal Law also includes several other provisions that seek to criminalize 
intentional negligence, injury or death while in custody, verbal abuse and insults, and physical intimidation. 
Police personnel who violate these provisions can be punished with a minimum of fifteen days to six 
months of “criminal detention” or up to three years of imprisonment; plus, heavier punishment is reserved for 
severe cases of torture that cause disability to the prisoners.246 But punishments are rarely imposed on prison 
officials for using torture; usually they are threatened with lighter punishment of “criminal detention,” which 
also is seldom enforced. Lack of insufficient sanctions and enormous pressure on the judicial bodies to crack 
down on crime has enabled prison officials to rely on torture with impunity. Moreover, the scope of Article 189 
of the Criminal Law, which seeks to punish official misconduct, is so narrowly defined that it is applicable only 
to “judicial personnel,” thereby exempting prison guards and policemen, and the law is only applicable under 
special circumstances, such as extreme cases of torture, abuse, and other forms of ill treatment. It is inapplicable 
in cases where handcuffs and leg-irons are routinely attached to prisoners because prison regulations allow such 
usage. 
China’s criminal law contains built-in vagueness, various loopholes, and serious structural weakness that 
allow prison guards to use handcuffs and leg-irons in such a way that it inflicts severe pain on prisoners. 
Common forms of torture include regular beatings with fists or with a variety of instruments, use of electric 
batons or cattle-prods that cause severe electric shock, use of handcuffs and leg shackles to suspend prisoners in 
painful positions, incarceration in tiny and filthy cells, forcing prisoners to work under extremely inhospitable 
conditions, food and sleep deprivation, and denial of medical care.247 According to the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights, the use of various methods of torture include regular beatings, use of electric 
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shock batons, cigarette burns, hooding, drowning in raw sewage, forcing prisoners into uncomfortable positions 
such as “tiger bench,” “exhausting an eagle” “reversing an airplane,” sleep deprivation, starvation, and hard 
labor are routine and common throughout the Chinese detention system.248 Another practice that allows the 
prison guards to circumvent the implications of the Criminal Procedure Law is through the use of “cell bosses” 
or “prison trustees” to commit acts of torture and pain to extract confessions or inflict punishment on other 
prisoners and detainees.249 Cell bosses or prison trustees are prisoners favored by the prison authorities to 
supervise and terrorize other prisoners at their behest. They are employed to do the dirty work, which allow 
prison authorities to deny responsibility for “acts of torture,” and absolve themselves of any formal wrongdoing. 
Using cell bosses permits prison wardens to stay within the bounds of law, while enabling them to use coercion 
to extract confessions. This problem is compounded by the fact that procurators charged with the task of 
supervising law-enforcement activities do not act or are otherwise powerless to act, because procurators are also 
expected to work closely with the police to investigate and prosecute criminals.250 
The three principal organs of the Chinese criminal justice system—the police (arrest and detention), the 
procuratorate (investigation), and the judiciary (law and sanctions)—are expected to operate independently of 
each other, but this independence rarely manifests in practice. It is highly unusual for the judiciary to question 
the investigative abilities of the procuratorate or challenge the guilty verdict prescribed by the police. 
Unfettered police powers are the primary explanatory variable for the miscarriage of justice and violation of 
human rights within China’s criminal justice system. Failure to implement legal protections guaranteed by the 
various laws make prisoners exceedingly vulnerable to police brutality and torture. Prisoners are routinely held 
incommunicado for months before they are granted trial or formally charged. Although access to legal counsel 
is allowed under Article 96 of the revised Criminal Procedure Law, it does not provide immediate or easy 
access to lawyers, doctors, or the family after detention.251 While a prisoner is in custody he or she has to apply 
for permission to seek access to legal counsel, and such legal counsel is only available when the case moves 
from the procuratorate to the judicial branch for trial. However, if the case is concerned with “endangering state 
security,” “preservation of state secrets,” or “political sensitive cases,” the law is not clear on access to legal 
representation; lawyers are intimidated and bullied from representing such clients, and their roles in formal 
criminal trials have been seriously circumscribed.252 Since prisoners are held captive by prison guards for 
months they become highly susceptible to torture and other coercive techniques. Lack of adequate legal 
protection and insufficiency of laws to criminally prosecute torturers allow security forces to use torture with 
impunity.253 Besides, the structure of an authoritarian country—which disallows any form of public scrutiny of 
its human rights practices or free discussion of the inadequacies of the legal system in the domestic press—
shields the government and its policing agency from sustained public scrutiny. The police, procuratorate, and 
the judicial organs are not subject to any independent oversight; hence they are tremendously vulnerable to 
political influences and local protectionism, and become easily corruptible. In addition, the lack of sufficient 
procedural safeguards, routine official cover-up of incidents of torture, and the misuse of the penal system to 
suppress political dissent has emboldened security forces to act with impunity. 
Torture has become routine and institutionalized in the Chinese penal system, which prevents the PRC 
government from complying with the provisions of the Torture Convention, despite various attempts to reform 
its criminal law. Some government officials have begun to openly acknowledge that the torture problem is 
“highly widespread,” “deeply entrenched,” and that this problem has been exacerbated by the ineptness and 
corruption of the local governments.254 Legal scholars have specifically pointed to the excessive concentration 
of investigative and detention powers in the hands of public security organs as one of the critical institutional 
weaknesses of the Chinese legal system.255 Lack of counter-balancing institutional safeguards to check the 
tendentious and overzealous behavior of the policing agencies has rendered the amended criminal laws largely 
moot. Additionally, local protectionism and clan politics have prevented the ability of the Beijing government 
to monitor the compliance of provincial authorities with the criminal laws and international human rights 
conventions. The People’s Republic has also refused to recognize the competence of the Committee Against 
Torture (CAT) to directly receive individual complaints from Chinese citizens under Article 22 of the Torture 
Convention on the grounds that it violates national sovereignty. The Chinese government has also exempted 
itself from the obligations under Article 20 and 30 of the Torture Convention, which behooves the state party in 
question to cooperate with the convention to investigate allegations of systematic torture.256 
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Repression and Control of Religious Activities 
China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on October 1998 and ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in March 2001 (see Table 1). The 
signing of the Civil and Political Rights treaty and the ratification of the Economic and Social Rights 
convention is a significant step forward. Nevertheless, various reports show that genuine change in human 
rights practices is yet to emerge; importantly in the areas of religious freedoms and civil liberties little 
improvement has occurred despite some positive developments in other areas of the criminal justice system. 
According to the provisions of Article 18 of the ICCPR, “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion,” which includes the freedom to “adopt a religion or belief” either individually or in a 
group and practice a “religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”257 In addition, Article 18 
of ICCPR requires participating states not to interfere or use coercion to impair the freedom of individuals in 
either choosing or practicing their religion. 
Similarly, provisions of ICESCR also indicate that state parties are expected to respect basic social and 
cultural rights of its citizens and not discriminate on the basis of religion. Since reforms began there has been 
steady increase in the number of adherents to Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism—the 
five major religions officially acknowledged by the 2004 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA).258 However, 
according to regulations passed in 1994, the PRC government claimed that religious activities would be 
regulated and monitored by state authorities to ensure that such activities do not “undermine national unity and 
social stability.”259 To facilitate monitoring, all places such as, “temples, monasteries, mosques, churches, or 
other fixed locations where religious activities are conducted” must be registered with the Religious Affairs 
Bureau.260 Any religious activity that is conducted without the explicit sanction of the Religious Affairs Bureau 
is considered to be illegal, and involved individuals or religious groups are subject to sanctions. 
Religious activities of Tibetan Buddhists, Uighur Muslims, and Chinese Catholics are strictly controlled 
and monitored. The PRC government is chiefly concerned with the allegiance of local populations with 
religious figures such as the Dalai Lama and the Pope. Followers of the Dalai Lama and the Pope are referred to 
as “splittists” due to their allegiance to foreign religious leaders intent on splitting China. Tibetan Buddhists and 
Catholics are attacked for failing to demonstrate patriotism in all religious activities.261 The separatist 
movements in Tibet and Xinjiang are closely woven with religiosity and the public security agencies have not 
been able to discriminate among peaceful expressions of religiosity, regional separatism, and terrorism. After 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the crackdown on the Xinjiang Muslims has been exceptionally severe. In an effort to 
stanch religious extremism in Xinjiang, authorities have began to closely supervise private activities such as 
religious ceremonies, weddings, funerals, circumcisions, and house moving rituals. Overt expressions of 
religious loyalty such as wearing a veil or other religious attire are forbidden. In addition, Uighur language 
instruction has been banned at Xinjiang University and Uighur language books were burnt in a public 
ceremony.262 The Chinese government has also openly tangled with the Vatican Church by establishing its own 
bishops in contravention of the Catholic Church. It also cracked down on groups and individuals expressing 
loyalty to the exiled Tibetan Buddhist leader, the Dalai Lama. Organized religion is viewed as a threat to 
national security because religion is closely associated with ethnic identities that may involve legitimate 
separatist claims, which contrasts sharply with the idea of a unitary Chinese state that encompasses all 
autonomous regions including the renegade island of Taiwan. 
Chinese delegates to the UN Commission on Human Rights have consistently argued that “no one, no 
association and no religion can be allowed to violate national law, infringe upon the interests of the people, 
foment splits among nationalists, and sabotage national unity.”263 Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin wrote 
an article in 1996 in the People’s Daily in which he stressed the need to “unite and educate religious 
personalities in a planned way,” and assist religious groups that promote patriotism and national solidarity. 
Although Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution guarantees protection of rights of believers as well as non-
believers, it points out that “freedom of religious belief” is not equivalent to “freedom for religion.” Put 
differently, Article 36 can be interpreted to mean that everyone is free to have religious beliefs of their choice, 
but they are not allowed to organize and practice their religion without official sanction from the state. Internal 
documents of the Communist Party smuggled out of China and published in various media outlets have revealed 
that a sustained campaign to disbar unauthorized religious groups is underway.264 In this regard, the Falun Gong 
spiritual movement, singularly, has borne the wrath of the Chinese Communist Party because of the intense 
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concern that well-organized groups pose a potential political threat to the party, destabilize economic reforms, 
and produce social disorder. 

 35 
PART SEVEN 
Conclusion 
 
China’s human rights troubles are variegated, deep-seated, complex, and intimately intertwined with its 
economic and political transformation. Broadly, there is the issue of the Chinese legal system, especially its 
criminal law, which is plagued with problems of corruption and local protectionism. The judiciary lacks 
transparency and independence, and the policing agencies often rely on physical coercion to extract 
confessions; arbitrary detentions are common, and capital punishments are used rather indiscriminately. The 
nascent legal profession lacks autonomy, independence, and proper professional status; Chinese lawyers are 
subject to various political interferences, especially criminal lawyers.265 In addition, there is the suppression of 
political and cultural freedoms of Uighurs in Xinjiang, Buddhists in Tibet, Christians in Southern China, and 
Falun Gong practitioners. The rapid and radical economic transformation is causing immense problems in 
administering justice and providing compensation to rural peasants and urban dwellers displaced by 
monumental public work projects and illegal land seizures. This has sparked sporadic episodes of violence in 
various parts of the country, which have been viciously put down by the public security agencies. According to 
official Chinese government sources, it is estimated that last year alone there were more than 80,000 incidents 
involving public protests often accompanied by violence. These cases of mass public incidents invariably result 
from spontaneous outpouring of displeasure at governmental misuse of power, land seizures without 
compensation, and expression of anger at poor distribution of social services. 
At a more structural level, there is a systemic problem of silencing all forms of dissent critical of public 
policies and the Communist Party. All varieties of media discussions and public criticisms of government 
policies, the CCP and its leaders, as well as academic or intellectual discourse on the Tiananmen massacre and 
Cultural Revolution are prohibited, and a general ban on discussing topics such as democracy and human rights 
persist. Recently, a series of media sanctions preventing any discussion of “sudden events” or cases of public 
protests that might be damaging to the credibility of the party-state was announced.266 Unmitigated persistence 
of human rights issues and the failure of the PRC government to address them in a meaningful, transparent, and 
coherent manner is puzzling, troublesome, and contains serious implications for China’s global leadership and 
its continued economic dominance. This leads to the central question posed at the beginning of this article: why, 
despite reforms, modernization, scorching economic development, participation in international legal regimes, 
and China’s emergence as a major international actor have not produced a meaningful impact on China’s human 
rights policies and practices? Put another way, why is PR China continuing to resist or unable to make changes 
in the human rights arena? 
In this review article, I have argued that China’s inability to implement genuine and full reforms in human 
rights and internalize international human rights norms can be explained by a combination of three 
determinative factors: (1) Confucian influence and imperial institutionalist heritage, (2) Maoist socialist order, 
and (3) authoritarian-developmentalism, which have interacted in multiple ways at different critical junctures 
and inhibited the Chinese state. The Confucian and socialist-collectivist values are embedded in the public and 
private sphere and the continuity of the imperial institutional heritage continues to influence the organization 
and functioning of China’s political-legal structure. These values have circumscribed the ability of the different 
governments—Republican-Nationalist, Communist, and post-Communist—to break away from the institutional 
and cultural weight of historical, social, cultural, and political practices. Importantly, the institutional factors 
have manifested themselves in the form of extraordinary sensitivity and even resistance to the underlying values 
and principles of foreign legal institutions. 
Post-1949 revolutionary China considered human rights promoted by the Western nations, especially the 
excessive focus on civil and political rights and individual liberty, to be antagonistic to the Maoist conception of 
the state. Mao’s China was based on the edifice of state ownership of production, equality in the distribution of 
resources and wages, access to social welfare, and guarantee of the right to work. Collectivist ideals are 
reflected in China’s international posture, particularly in the form of anti-Western and anti-colonial 
pronouncements. The People’s Republic became an advocate for communist and socialist regimes in the 
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developing world. Notably, the disproportionate emphasis of the Western powers on civil and political liberties 
was interpreted as an intentional political ploy to erode the collectivist ideals of the Chinese state. The reluctant 
signature of the United States on the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Convention and its continued 
refusal to ratify this convention have only bolstered China’s argument that international human rights regimes 
are slanted heavily in favor of civil and political liberties. Since the introduction of reforms in 1978, the PRC 
government has placed extraordinary emphasis on economic growth and the expense of political development. 
All of the post-Mao governments have allowed Chinese citizens to enjoy unprecedented economic 
freedoms and extraordinary latitude in social relations. However, both Mao’s regime and the post-Mao 
governments are undifferentiated when it comes to their overall human rights policy, although the relative 
scales of human suffering have been drastically reduced after the conclusion of Chairman Mao’s rule. During 
the revolutionary era both economic development and human rights suffered, whereas the post-Mao 
governments have made enormous gains in the economic sector, but retained the authoritarian governmental 
structure and placed considerable restrictions on civil and political liberties and legal rights. This new 
authoritarianism is now directed towards sustaining the blistering economic growth and maintaining social 
stability as inequality expands and rights consciousness of the Chinese citizens increases. 
China’s international accession has also been accompanied by a surge of reactive nationalism—periodically 
expressed in the form of anti-Japanese and anti-American outbursts—which has emboldened China’s leaders to 
dismiss international criticism of its human rights policies. Specifically, the party-state has found success 
through intensifying Chinese national pride to deflect international criticisms of its human rights violations. 
China’s behavior towards the human rights regimes is largely influenced by the shifts in the political philosophy 
of the ruling party as it embarks on a massive transformation towards a market based economic system. 
Furthermore, historical experience and homegrown intellectual discourse on law and politics have influenced 
China’s combative posture towards the international human rights organizations. Although China has ratified 
nine major human rights conventions, it has engaged only in procedural cooperation. 
Overall, in this article, I have presented an argument that emphasizes the sui generis character of China’s 
imperial heritage, its authoritarian political edifice, and Confucian political philosophy. The distinctiveness of 
Confucianism and its myriad influences on the evolution of the Chinese society and its legal system, three 
millennia of autonomous political development, and colonial experience cannot be easily ignored while 
understanding China’s attitude towards international law and human rights regimes. Human rights discourse and 
rule-of-law movement derived from Western political thought and its distinctive European and American 
political experience when juxtaposed against three millennia of Chinese political development is likely to be 
indubitably discordant. Besides the inimitable influence of Chinese legal thought and the uniqueness of local 
institutions, this article has emphasized the marriage of authoritarianism and the new developmentalist 
ideology, which emerged after 1978, as a crucial factor in understanding why China has failed to fully embrace 
international human rights and introduce judicious legal reforms. Today Beijing is more interested in 
consolidating its economic gains, reasserting its power, and fulfilling its national strategic objectives such as 
finding suppliers for its growing energy needs, politically isolating Japan, and incorporating Taiwan into the 
mainland. Given these strategic goals, Chinese leaders are less interested in creating a system that will generate 
or tolerate more political dissent. 
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